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I. Introduction
On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union commenced massive
troop movements into the neighboring state of Afghanistan. Be-
sides invoking the obligatory explanation that the troops had
been "invited" or "requested" by the true Afghan government, the
Soviet Union further maintained that its actions were justified
by the fact that it could "not allow Afghanistan's being turned
into a bridgehead for preparation of imperialist aggression
against the Soviet Union." It is difficult to interpret this
statement as anything but a claim to a right of self-defense
extending beyond its borders into the territory of another sov-
ereign state.
On June 7, 1981, the Israeli air force executed an aerial
attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor site of the non-neighboring
state of Iraq, after approaching through the airspace of Saudia
Arabia (and perhaps Jordan). In announcing the completion of the
attack, the Israeli prime minister, Menachem Begin, declared the
attack to have been conducted as an act in "supreme, legitimate
self-defense.
"
These current invocations of a claim to an international
right to exercise anticipatory self-defense outside one's own
borders highlight the critical need for maintaining and reas-
serting objective criteria and analysis of international prin-
ciples concerning self-defense, for as can be easily seen, one
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state's security needs often contradict another state's rights to
territorial integrity and political independence. Any expansion
of the one contributes to the diminuition of the other.
The objectives of this paper are, therefore, twofold: (1)
to investigate, both from a conventional and a customary-law
standpoint, the current guidelines and groundrules which apply to
any international claim of a right to anticipatory self-defense,
and (2) to apply these internationally accepted standards to the
Afghani and Osirak fact situations, in order to ascertain Soviet
and Israeli compliance with, or defiance of, these standards. It
is considered particularly important that the actions of both the
Soviet Union and Israel are addressed in the following discussion,
as their political ideologies are quite disparate, thus forcing
the analysis, if it is to be consistent in each instance, to
restrict itself to non-ideological, objective criteria, comporting
with the touchstone principle of universality in the application
3
of international law.
II. Principles of International Law Concerning
Anticipatory Self-Defense
A. GENERAL REFLECTIONS
It is almost unnecessary to say that self-defense is a
fundamental cornerstone of both domestic and international legal
systems. No matter how refined and pervasive a legal system may
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be, it will always be inadequate to afford immediate protection
to a would-be victim in an emergency situation. Punishment after
the fact, although important, never compensates completely for
the loss of life and limb which may have occurred in the interim.
This is especially true under the minimum world public order
system currently extant under international law, which possesses
a sanctioning process which frequently lacks the community will
to bring to bear penalties commensurate with the delict that has
been done. Too often the world chooses to tolerate the wrong-
doer, whether for political, ideological or economic reasons,
leaving the victim state occupied or annexed, dominated or dis-
membered. Without the vesting of a right to defend itself at the
outset of the aggression, the victim state would be deprived not
only of the ability to directly respond in self-preservation
during the course of an attack, but also of the indirect ability
to prevent the initiation of the aggression altogether, by main-
taining in preparedness defensive measures which tend toward a
balance of power, as a deterrent to expansionist ic tendencies of
other states. This principle of deterrence serves not only self-
preservation, but due to its nature of being in advance of the
aggression, the preservation of peace in general, thus being of
benefit not only to the parties involved, but to the cause of
international peace and security as a whole.
The pivotal nature of self-defense within the realities of
our present world legal structure is clearly reflected in the
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language of the United Nations Charter, where it is referred to
4
as an "inherent" right of all states. Tha basic parameters of
this "inherent" right, however, were well established in the
customary Law of Nations long before the drafters of the Char-
ter included it in their world constitutional framework.
B. THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
This "inherent" right of states to exercise self-defense has
been clothed by customary law with clear principles of delimita-
tion, in order to restrict its applicability to clearly defensive
situations. Were a state to be allowed unbridled latitude in its
application of the right to self-defense, each aggressor could
justify its expansionist actions on its "defensive" needs, with
any action or inaction of another state serving as a predicate
for a "defensive" response of armed force.
In order to guard against such possible abuses, customary
international law has imposed two basic requirements upon the
exercise of the right of self-defense: (1) that the circum-
stances clearly support the necessity of taking some defensive
action, and (2) that the action ultimately taken is not dispro-
portionate to the injury reasonably anticipated or already in-
5
curred. Beyond this, customary law ascribes the ultimate, after-
the-fact determination of these two requisites of necessity and
proportionality to the community of nations, that is, the initial
judgement of the claimant must be held up to the light of public
scrutiny, for without such external policing of the right of
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self-defense, the claimant would become his own adjudicator, and
6
the law of nations would lose all normative content.
1. Necessity
In order to comply with the requirement of necessity, a
resort to armed force as a defensive measure can only be justi-
fied if no effective peaceful alternative is available for a just
resolution of the dispute, given the time constraints involved.
Viewed administratively, the threatened state must exhaust all
available peaceful remedies that might produce a just resolution;
viewed chronologically, the immediacy of the threat will deter-
mine the viability, if any, and extent, of the required pursuit
of such peaceful avenues of just settlement. The less imminent
the threat, the more demanding the requirement of exhaustion of
7
peaceful alternatives.
During the course of the diplomatic correspondence which
surrounded the Caroline dispute of 1837, Daniel Webster, then
United States Secretary of State, formulated the following oft-
quoted definition of the requisite necessity for resort to armed
force in self-defense: "(The claimant state must demonstrate a)
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
o
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The British,
knowing that the steamer Caroline was being used to transport men
and supplies to Canadian rebels, had crossed the Niagra River
into United States territory and, after a skirmish that cost the
lives of two United States nationals, had caused the Caroline
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to be destroyed. The United States protested the incursion, and
Mr. Webster's words were written in disputation of the British
g
claim of necessity.
The extreme strictness of Webster's definition has been
questioned by scholars of international law, as it would seem to
require the target state to forbear until the trigger is being
pulled and the damage about to be unavoidably suffered, which may
have been acceptable in an era of smoothbore cannon and frontier
musket, but which could have disasterous implications if applied
to an age of precision guided missiles and multiple-warhead
10
nuclear weapons. Delivery-system capability and destructive
capacity of current weaponry must necessarily be factored into the
11
reasonableness quotient of any self-defense formula for today.
Mr. Webster's contention as to the exacting nature of the
requirement of necessity must also be put into the context of his
position; he was the United States' spokesman as a counter-
claimant against Britain's justification of self-defense, and
thus one might anticipate an extremely restrictive analysis by
the "plaintiff" of the defense being proffered by the opponent.
The fact that the United States chose not to pursue its protest,
after a perfunctory apology by the British, unaccompained by any
reparation for the loss of life or property, tends to provide
some evidence that even the United States doubted the persua-
siveness which its own proposition might have had in front of a
12
neutral arbitral commission. For purposes of subsequent analysis
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below, however, it should be remembered that Mr. Webster's formu-
lation was addressed to an instance of claimed self-defense that
was both anticipatory , that is preemptive, and invasive in nature,
two elements that may exact a higher standard of definitive
13
evidence before the threshold of reasonableness is met.
2. Proportionality
If the element of necessity is met and the circumstances
dictate that justice can be served only by resort to a defensive
response involving armed force, the principle of proportionality
requires that only such force be exercised as is necessary to
14deter the offending state's aggressive action. All international
scholars agree that the proportionality test involves at least a
quantitative standard, in that the amount of counterforce exer-
cised should not be clearly excessive to the needs of the target
15
state in its defense. On this plane of analysis, the requirement
of proportionality involves the same value-conserving interests
as the military concept of economy of force. As a classic ex-
ample of quantum disproportionality , Nazi Germany's massive
invasion and conquest of Poland was claimed to have been but a
defensive action to minor border skirmishes allegedly initiated
1 7by small contingents of Polish guards? The Blitzkrieg response
was geometrically removed from the supposed skirmish stimulus.
Given the proliferation of nuclear weaponry today and the
universal concern for the containment of its actual use, most
publicists would also imbue the rule of proportionality with a
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qualitative factor, restricting any defensive response to a non-
nuclear threat to strictly conventional weaponry. The deterrent
effect of the possession of a nuclear option is highly touted,
but the possibilities of escalation and world conflagration would
seem to counterbalance in such an instance any contention of a
18defensive first-use right of even tactical nuclear firepower.
3. Examples of World War II Claims to Self-Defense
The events of World War II provided the background for two
notable claims to a right to anticipatory self-defense, with
world opinion generally confirming the propriety (that is, the
necessity and proportionality) of the one and the questionability
of the other.
In the first instance, the United Kingdom was confronted
with a critical dilemma in June of 1940 when the Vichy French
Government came to armistice terms with Nazi Germany, for the
latter lacked only the seapower necessary to effectuate the in-
vasion of England, and the former possessed substantial fleet
contingents at Alexandria (Egypt), Oran (French North Africa),
and Martinique (French Antillies) which could have radically
tipped the seapower scales in favor of such an invasion's suc-
19
cess. The British therefore directed communiques to these con-
tingents' commanders, requesting that their fleets either be
put under British control until the end of the war or be retained
by the French but in a non-threatening status, as by proceeding




complete demilitarization of the ships themselves. The Fleet
Commander at Oran rejected these alternatives. Faced with the
immediate threat that the seapower of the Oran fleet presented and
its implications as to the very self-preservation of the United
Kingdom, the British, after further fruitless negotiations,
exercised the only remaining option left to them, by attacking
and substantially destroying the Oran fleet before it fell into
21
the hands of Germany.
In light of the totality of the circumstances, world opin-
ion, with the understandable exception of the Axis powers, ac-
cepted the reasonableness of Britain's action. The exigencies of
war and national survival required an immediate solution, and the
22
Fleet Commander at Oran had declined any viable peaceful solution.
In contrast to the conditions surrounding Oran, Nazi Germany
invoked a claim to anticipatory self-defense to justify its inva-
sion of Norway, in April 1940, maintaining that this violation of
Norway's neutrality was necessitated by the alleged imminence of
23
an Allied intention to occupy that strategically located country.
The International Military Tribunal considered this claim of
anticipatory self-defense during the subsequent war-crime pro-
ceedings at Nuremberg, and although some evidence was presented
which confirmed that the Allies were at the time considering the
occupation of the Norwegian coast, the Tribunal concluded that
Germany did not know of this evidence at the time of the decision
to invade and that the invasion was based on strategic considera-




self-defense. No question of an imminent threat to Germany was
involved. On the contrary, the seizure of Norway was to increase
Germany's threat to Great Britian, by the use of Norwegian air-
fields to bomb Britian and its shipping and the use of its Atlan-
25
tic harbors for Nazi submarines and naval forces. The objective
of self-defense is the conservation of values; Germany's actions evi-
danced an objective of a unilateral extension of values.
4. Customary Law Extant at the Time of the Charter
The groundrules of necessity and proportionality (coupled
with the objective judgement of the world community) were thus
clearly established in international customary law at the time of
the San Francisco Conference and the drafting of the Charter of
the United Nations. Those groundrules, if met, allowed not only
for in statu self-defense in the face of an armed attack, but
also, as in the case of Oran, for anticipatory self-defense
outside the threatened state's boundaries. Whether the drafters
of the Charter intended to carry forward that established frame-
work, or to substantially restrict the applicability of the right
of self-defense, has been a topic of marked debate.
C. THE CONVENTIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE:
ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER
Article 51 of the Charter provides:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
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by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense
shall be irranediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way effect the authority and the responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restate international peace and security."
1. The Restrictive Interpretation
To those publicists who favor a restrictive approach to the
right of self-defense, the words of Article 51 clearly indicate a
demise of anticipatory self-defense, for the "inherent right" may
27
only be exercised "if an armed attack occurs." Besides the
apparent straightforwardness of the language used, the proponents
of this position point to the substantial potential for abuse to
which the concept of anticipatory or preemptive self-defense is
28
subject, and that the danger of the doctrine in the hands of a
deceitful aggressor outweighs the infrequent benefit such a
doctrine might afford to a truly threatened victim. Although the
possibility of a great-power veto or the oft-times weak decisional
will of the United Nations membership in general relegates the
United Nations peace-keeping mechanisms to a less-than-perfect
model, these mechanisms were considered the best possible sub-
stitute (under the circumstances) for the individual or collec-
tive right to anticipatory self-defense that, before the Charter,
29had been recognized under international law.
Relevant to this interpretation also is the apprehension
concerning not only the evildoer wrapped in legal trappings, but
also the nation who, with the best of intentions, but with the
worst of intelligence-gathering resources, or with a hypersensi-
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tive sense of security, might totally misinterpret the intentions
of another state and thereby launch an attack which might escalate
the world into a holocaust for naught. In the latter instance,
the built-in protection of subsequent world review as to the
reasonableness of the action might afford little solace, as given
the nuclear arsenals of today, the point of no return could well
be passed before such a process of world review could even commence
In short, the view in favor of a restrictive interpretation
perceives the drafters of the Charter as has having weighed these
considerations and, as a consequence, having found the right to
30
anticipatory self-defense not worth the preserving.
2. The Expansive Interpretation
Contrary to this viewpoint, other scholars find difficulty
in ascertaining any unambiguous meaning in the words of Article
51 itself, and, upon an evaluation of the underlying purposes of
the Charter and its negotiational history, find substantial
evidence of the intent to preserve the customary-law methodology
surrounding the right to self-defense, including the right to the
31
reasonable exercise of anticipatory self-defense. The very word
"inherent" implies a carry-over of something unalienable into the
new system under the Charter, and in fact the word "inherent"
would appear somewhat inarticulate or out-of-place in a sentence
theoretically intended to restrict that right as previously
understood. Further, as pointed out by Professor Myres McDougal
,
the restrictive view requires the reading into the Article of a
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word that is not there, in that the phrase "in case of armed
32
attack" must be reworded to read "only in case of armed attack."
By the very fact that the additional word is required to arrive
at a clear statement of the restrictive view, the phrase as it
33
stands in Article 51 remains ambiguous as to its intent.
Opponents of the restrictive view refer also to the general
purposes of the Charter, the foremost of which is the preserva-
tion of international peace and security. Without the deterrent
effect that a right of anticipatory self-defense affords, an
aggressor is emboldened and enabled to proceed unhindered with a
preparation and pre-positioning of his war machinery to the point
that an armed attack may not then be necessary, for the reason-
able leaders of the target state can see only the futility of
resistance and the certainity of innocent bloodshed. Nazi
Germany used such tactics to dismember and then to eliminate
Czechoslovakia as a sovereign state, through open coercion but
without even the need to exercise the awesome armed force that it
33a
was clearly prepared and willing to use. As another example,
Emperor Haile Selassie respected the literal interpretation of
the Pact of Paris and the theoretical protection of the League of
Nations and thus watched without preemptive action as fascist
Italy inexorably amassed its forces on his country's frontiers.
By the time Italy chose its moment to raise the attack, the
34
ultimate outcome was left in little doubt.
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Given the uncertainty of the enforcement mechanisms of the
United Nations, it cannot be lightly assumed that the Charter in-
tended for a target state to forego what might be its pivotal
protection, the right to anticipatory self-defense as recognized
under customary international law. As one author has noted:
The inevitable time-lag between intLatlon of highly intense
coercion and appropriate determination and authorization
by the general security organization, and the ever present
possibility of the organization's failure to reach any
determination at all, make such a recommendation poten-
tially disastrous for defending states. ^^'
This evaluation rings even truer in an age of nuclear arse-
nals and delivery systems, as to be legally bound to wait until
the actual nuclear attack occurs, before being entitled to exer-
cise one's right to self-defense, is to divest the right of any
functional significance, for annihilation of the social and
political fabric of the target state (the "self" that was to be
defended) is by that time already guaranteed.
3. Compromise Interpretations
Between these two poles of interpretation, i.e.
,
the re-
strictive view that the Charter broke with the past and limited
self-defense to actual repulsion of armed attack, and the expan-
sive view that Article 51 was intended to carry-over the cus-
tomary law, including anticipatory self-defense, into the new
international regime, lie numerous compromise interpretations by
publicists who accept the element of armed attack as conditioning




ticity in the conceptualization of "armed attack" itself. The
point of the actual initiation of an attack, for example, can be
conceived as having occurred somewhat before any border was
crossed or any missile made airborn, with various scholars opting
for differing determinants as to when the preparation for attack
reaches a point unambiguous enough to justify an armed defensive
reaction by a reasonable and prudent target state.
These compromise interpretations, therefore, recognize the
fundamental fact that the aggressor is not always he who fires
37
the first shot and in fact that a right to resort to anticipatory
self-defense is not only justified by certain circumstances, but
may in fact be the best solution under those circumstances in
promoting the cause of international peace and security (and
therefore not inconsistent with, but condusive to, greater re-
spect for the basic purposes of the United Nations Charter). On
the other hand, proponents of the compromise position are reluc-
tant to interpret Article 51 of the Charter as a grandfather
clause for the full breadth of anticipatory self-defense as
recognized under pre-Charter customary international law, for
they point, inter alia
,
to the abuses which have historically
occurred in the alleged exercise of that right and the inadver-
tant holocaust that might occur, given the nuclear destructive
force of today, were a hypersensitive nation to "jump the nuclear
gun" after misinterpreting the intentions of its opponent.
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4. Comparison of the Various Interpretations
It should be initially noted that almost any norm possesses
the potential for misapplication or manipulation, and thus to
argue, as the compromise and restrictive viewpoints do, that past
instances of abuse mandate a repeal of the normative principle
38
itself seems unjustified. The fact that the abuses have been
recognized as abuses tends to confirm the viability of the under-
lying principle, rather than provide precedent for its revocation.
No one contests that aggressors have looked on occasion to
artificial arguments of anticipatory self-defense to justify
their actions, but the community of states, after finding in-
adequate necessity or proportionality, has rightfully rejected
these claims and condemned the claimants. The same would be true
if the offender had attempted to manipulate a norm concerning
neutrality or a freedom of the high seas; the reasonableness of
his action would be subject to the decision-making process of the
world community, and that process, not the claimant, would be the
final judge as t^ the applicability of the norm in question.
Norms will always be violated, but that does not detract from the
propriety of the norm itself, unless the world community defaults
on its decision-making responsibility, in which case, over a
period of time, the particular claim will thereby become accepted
as the new practice of states.
In the area of anticipatory self-defense, a direct parallel
can be drawn to its applicability under domestic law, where the
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initial decision to resort to defensive force must be made by the
defendant under the exigencies of the moment; the ultimate deter-
mination, as to the reasonableness of the action and the subjec-
tive perceptions that led to it, remains however within the
competence of the appropriate court. The sanctioning process of
the international community differs, but the need for objective
decision-making does not. To deny a target state its "inherent"
right to self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense where
necessity and proportionality require, simply because another
state may have abused the right on another occasion, results in
the curious solution of penalizing the principled state, while
approving the precedent of the abuser. If carried to its natural
extension, such a practice would compromise all rules of conduct,
leaving the law of realpolitik, that is, no law all, as the
benchmark of international interaction.
To deny a wrongfully threatened state any recourse to an-
ticipatory self-defense, under circumstances wherein all objec-
tive observers might agree that such action is the only option
available if the target state is to survive, is to deny that
state its very right to self-preservation, a right which con-
stitutes the basic cornerstone of the Law of Nations and accounts
for the reason that the right of self-defense is deemed "in-
herent" under the Charter.
Given this fact, it should not be lightly presumed that
Article 51 of the Charter was intended to abridge the breadth of
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this reasonable right of self-defense' as it had evolved under
customary international law, especially within a Charter frame-
work which reaffirmed the rights of each state to political
independence and territorial integrity and which condemned not
only the use of force, but the threat of force, which might
compromise these rights.
Even if it were assumed that the drafters of the Charter en-
visioned full cooperation by the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council and thus a vastly improved world system of en-
forcement action against aggression, it could hardly have been
presumed that the provisions of the Charter would have effec-
tively prevented aggression, as opposed to penalizing it after
the fact. Penalties gain retribution for society, whether muni-
cipal or international, and stand as a general dissuasion for
such conduct in the future, but if the victim has already died,
they serve as little solace in the ultimate sense.
Self-defense deals not with penalties, but with prevention.
If a state's very survival has been wrongfully placed in jeopardy,
it is not only reasonable for it to react, but it is unreasonable
to presume that the community of nations has denied it the right
to so react. The right is inherent, and the preventative nature
of the right denies any anlaysis which would require that the
trigger be pulled and the damage be as good as done before the
right comes into play. If well-developed systems of domestic
law, with consistent and effective sanctioning systems, continue
to appreciate the necessity for anticipatory self-defense where
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the exigencies of the moment leave no option, then it is doubtful
that the drafters of the minimum world order system of the Char-
ter, with its more diffuse and oft-times ineffective sanctioning
system, intended to discard it from the Law of Nations.
It is human and national nature to resist a wrongful threat
with whatever means are required. Curtailing the right of self-
defense by an interpretation of Article 51 which allows for its
exercise only after the trigger of aggression has been pulled
cannot be expected, as some publicists argue, to better serve the
anticipated goal of greater international peace and security, for
it will either encourage future Ethiopias, with fascists taking
advantage of the opportunity to openly position and focus the gun
so that it cannot miss once the "attack" is underway (for perhaps
the natural resources of the victim state are worth the after-
the-fact sanctions that the world might initiate), or, in the far
more likely alternative, the would-be target state will simply
ignore or circumvent the unreasonably restrictive norm, as that
norm exacts too terminal a price for the preventative protection
it is in no position to afford.
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is an excellent example of
the latter alternative — that is, the de facto exercise of the
right to reasonable anticipatory self-defense, but with the offi-
cial explanation of the action being based upon a different
40juridical formulation. The element of necessity was present, the
limited, non-invasive response was proportional to the threat.
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and the community of nations gave general concurrence to the rea-
sonableness of the actions taken, but since the United States
officially subscribes to the restrictive interpretation of
Article 51, and since no actual armed attack had occurred, the
U.S. refrained in its legal arguments from invoking the right of
41
anticipatory self-defense as justification for its actions.
The need for defensive action was irrepressible; no restric-
tive interpretation could change that. The restrictive interpre-
tation only caused the would-be target state to alter the legal
gloss, not forfeit the right to action in anticipatory self-
defense. It serves international peace and security no better,
and perhaps even worse, to have the necessary action be the same,
but to require the employment of more international lawyers to
edit and recredit the justification. As stated before, one
should not lightly presume such an intent on the part of the
drafters of the Charter.
To the extent that the actions of the United States during
the Cuban Missile Crisis were viewed by the world community as
involving justified measures of anticipatory self-defense, that
crisis also serves as a precedent which moots much of the debate
as to the original intent behind the words utilized in Article 51
42
of the Charter. No constitutional document is frozen in time and
immune from growth, as conditions continually change and circum-





The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for
example, concerning unreasonable searches and seizure, cannot be
analyzed strictly from the chronological mindset of the 18th
century, or else it is useless in dealing with electronic eaves-
dropping and computer technology of today. For 170 years a
search was thought to require a physical trespass into a pro-
tected area ( See Goldman v. U.S. , 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead
V. U.S. , 277 U.S. 438 (1928)), which certainly was the intent of
the founding fathers, but in 1967 the Supreme Court was not faced
with the world of Thomas Jefferson; it was faced with a contem-
porary world of sophisticated sensor devices which could easily
monitor a conversation from outside the area otherwise thought
43
protected. Thus in the case of Katz v. U.S.
,
the Court looked
not only to the words of the Amendment, but also to the purpose
behind the words, and it found that that purpose was to protect
the right to a reasonable expectation of privacy, an interest
common to both the citizens of the 1700 's and the citizens of
today. Given that purpose, it was clear that the Fourth Amend-
ment protected people, not places, and it protected them from the
unreasonable actions of government in general, whether by physi-
cal trespass or electronic intrusion.
It is in the nature of all constitutional frameworks to
evolve to meet the dynamics of change. The United Nations Char-
ter is no exception. If a provision can be rationally read to
allow for more than one interpretation, the interpretation given
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it by the practice and acquiescence of its constituents over the
course of time takes on critical significance. The dispute over
the original intent of Article 51 becomes more academic as pre-
cedents of accepted practice flesh out a contemporary view of its
scope. The community of nations observed the actions of the
United States in 1962 and a substantial majority voiced its
approval, indicating a continued place for the reasonable exer-
cise of anticipatory self-defense within the framework of the
44
United Nations Charter.
5. A Footnote on the Nuclear Prerogative
Even if one accepts the current legality under international
law of anticipatory self-defense, a dilemma inherent in both the
restrictive and more expansive views of Article 51 remains, as
both predicate part of their analysis upon the realities of the
most pressing peril of the world today: nuclear and thermo-
45
nuclear armaments. As mentioned above, the proponents of the
restrictive view cite the clear and irreversible dangers involved
in even a well-intentioned but misinformed state perceiving the
need for a preemptive nuclear strike, while the proponents of the
more expansive view point to the suicidal repercussions for a
state which refrains from reasonable defense until the aggressor
46has launched its nuclear arsenal. The dilemma is this: both
sides are right. The nuclear dimension of destruction is in no way
different, nor the probability of escalation no less real,
whether the nature of the first strike is in preemptive defense
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or in aggressive attack.
Once the nuclear option is exercised, the engagement of the
second strike response is almost a foregone conclusion. The
availability of tactical nuclear weaponry muddles somewhat the
certainty of a world holocaust, but once two strike forces are
escalated to a nuclear plane, the containment of the nuclear
theater solely to a battlefield scenario becomes extremely prob-
lematic, as one would have to assume a situation wherein command,
communication and control were still retained by proponents of
reason, whereas the presence of reason may seem to have been
already refuted by the command decision to initiate even battle-
field nuclear warfare in the first place.
Although the post-WW II practice of states has fortunately
not provided a nuclear battle precedent for analysis, the dilemma
referenced above would seem resolvable only if one attaches an
explicit rider to the right of anticipatory self-defense: that a
preemptive strike may only be exercised on the conventional
weapon lever. It must be granted that this restriction detracts
from the would-be victim's sovereign right to make the initial
determination as to the proportionality of the response to the
threat, but a number of arguments point to the sui generis
character of the nuclear question:
(1) Thirty years of international possession of nuclear weapons
have indicated that even the most expansionist states show no
enthusiasm for actually playing the nuclear card, tactical or
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strategic. Thus it is not irrational for the community of states
to attach in advance a per se unreasonableness to a target state's
subjective perception that an opponent's nuclear threat will in
fact be reduced to a nuclear attack, thus "necessitating" a
preemptive nuclear strike.
(2) Given the fact that the final judgement of the reasonableness
of an exercise of anticipatory self-defense falls upon the com-
munity of states, the unique nature of nuclear destructiveness
justifies that in such an instance "final" judgement shall be
made in advance for there may not be a community of nations
available after the nuclear crossfire begins.
(3) In light of the extreme repercussions, both immediate and
lingering, that a nuclear exchange will entail far beyond the
borders of the two specific participants, all of the nations of
the world community may effectively be called "victim partici-
pants," and thus the preemptive nuclear strike determination
becomes one of collective, vice individual, sovereignty.
(4) Even assuming that the state which is to be the object of the
preemptive nuclear strike does not possess a second strike nuclear
capability, the reality of international interdependencies and
alliances makes it all too likely that the first strike will
precipitate a nuclear Sarajevo.
The proposal discussed here, i.e.
,
that any exercise of the
right of anticipatory self-defense be categorically restricted to
conventional modalities, is not the law. Even though some might

argue that the entire nuclear-weapon issue has been resolved by
United Nations precedent such as the condemnation and outlawing
of the use of nuclear weapons voted upon in U.N.G.A. Resolution
48
1653 (XVI) of 1961, such arguments do not seem convincing in law
or in reality. Given at least the initial nonbinding quality of
a General Assembly Resolution, especially in conjunction with a
significant number of negative votes and absent ions, and given
the twenty-year interim to the present which has experienced
massive nuclear-arsenal increases, vice decreases, by the super-
powers of the world, it is difficult to maintain that such a
Resolution was law-declaratory at the time, or that it has ac-
quired, through customary law processes, a law-declaratory status
now. An internationally binding nuclear rulebook has yet to be
written; it is only suggested that reason would cause the inclu-
sion of an explicit non-nuclear condition on any nation's pre-
emptive-defense rights, whenever or if ever such a rulebook comes
into print.
III. TiETHODOLOGY OF DeCI SION-MaKI NG
If one assumes then that (1) either the original intent of
Article 51 of the Charter, or (2) the interpretive patina that
the practice and concurrence of states has subsequently lent it,
provides ample credentials for the continued legality of rea-
sonable anticipatory self-defense under international law, the
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vital issue that remains is one of decision-making methodology.
To agree that anticipatory self-defense is permissible when its
use is reasonable under the circumstances leads immediately to a
further question: what standards of reasonableness are to be
applied. As has already been noted, the question of reasonable-
ness attaches to both the elements requisite to the right
—
necessity and proportionality. And if the decision-making pro-
cess of the community of states concerning standards of reason-
ableness is to function consistently and objectively, an analytical
roadmap or framework must be formulated to ensure even application.
Since the would-be target state must make the initial deter-
mination as to those two elements, it has a right to know in
advance what general factors the ultimate decision-makers will
value, and what approximate weight each factor will have. Cer-
tainly no triphammer, failsafe formula is possible in advance,
for no two situations will be exactly the same; interpretation
and judgement can never be eliminated from any decision-making
process. The clearer the guidelines can be made, however, the
more likely the consistency and justness of the result, and
perhaps the more likely that the potential target state's deter-
mination will reflect a similar and thus hopefully more objec-
tive, analytical process.
Perhaps the major proponents of such a systematic analytical
framework are Professor Myres McDougal and Florentine Feliciano,
who have recommended a multifactor analysis based on the following
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categories: participants, objectives, methods, conditions, and
effects. In each instance of a state's claim of justification on
the basis of a right to anticipatory self-defense, each category
or factor would be carefully weighed by the community system in
order to give just consideration to the merits, vel non , of the
profferred claim. A brief outline of the McDougal/Feliciano
multi-factor decision-making process is provided below.
Characteristics of the Participants ^^
Certainly any analysis must begin with a clear identifi-
cation of the participants involved in the threatened conflict,
including their relative power status. Identification itself may
be complicated by the realities of international alliances, as in
the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the geographical focus centered
on Cuba, but the question of coercion and counter-coercion clearly
involved an international confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. In this era of "client states,"
"surrogates," "satellites," and "spheres of influence," care must
be exercised in evaluating the respective breadth or narrowness
of the threat posed, distilling therefrom a realistic conclusion
as to the breadth or narrowness of the participant base.
The relative power status is also pivotal in analyzing the
conflicting claims, as a response merited as between superpowers
might clearly be unwarranted if the responding superpower were
reacting to the threat of a substantially less powerful nation.
As has been noted supra, Nazi Germany claimed a right of self-
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defense in response to alleged border confrontations by Polish
border patrols, but given the disparate power positions of the
two nations, the response by Germany in 1939 of blitzkrieg and
the dismemberment of the Polish State could hardly be held to
have been proportional to the "threat," even if the existence of
the element of necessity for some immediate response were assumed
to have been present.
51
The Objectives of the Claimants .
Under the McDougal/Feliciano analysis, the objectives of the
participant claiming a right to the exercise of anticipatory self-
defense must be objectively evaluated from three directions, in
order to determine how closely those objectives comport with the
value-conserving purposes of legitimate self-defense and the
promotions of international peace and security in general. The
three angles of analysis include: (1) the conservation, vice
extension, of the "self"; (2) the degree of consequentiality of
the threatened injury alleged; and (3) the degree of inclusivity,
vice exclusivity, of the claim, i.e.
,
the breadth of the benefits,
multinational as opposed to solely national, which are to be
gained from the action.
(1) Conservation or extension.
As noted by McDougal and Feliciano:
Characterization of the real objectives of the
claimant in terms of extension or conservation is
most directly related to the requirements of per-
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missible self-defense. The very conception of
self-defense implies that the purpose of the
defender is to conserve its values rather than to
extend them through acquiring or destroying values
held by the opposing participant .52
The purportedly defensive nature of any action is called
seriously into question when the "prevention" of a threat turns
out to involve, for example, the extension of the claimant state's
value base, territorial or otherwise. Circumstances of reason-
able response may require the penetration of the other state's
boundaries in order to effectively terminate the threat, but when
a limited counter-offensive evolves into a status of prolonged
occupation, the claim of self-defense, when viewed objectively,
takes on an increasingly suspicious appearance of disguised
53
expansionism.
(2) Degree of consequentiality
.
The international community ascribes varying degrees of
importance to the various attributes of statehood, and, as one
might expect, the higher the importance, the more reasonable a
resort to force might be in the protection thereof. Thus, if the
very survival of a state is imminently threatened, the resort to
anticipatory force would be far more reasonable than if the
"threat" had only been to the inflated honor of the offended
state. The difference between a massive mobilization on the
target state's border and the seizure of a few of that state's
fishing boats in disputed waters is clear, and the community of
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nations clearly has a right to expect a different response, both
in modality and quantity.
(3) Degree of inclusivity or exclusivity.
Although not always determinative, the claim to a right
to anticipatory self-defense is certainly enhanced when the
claimant state can show that the response will legitimately serve
the common interests of states other than itself. As in the
example of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the initially unilateral
decision of the United States to take limited defensive action
against an imminent nuclear threat by the Soviet Union redounded
not only to the benefit of its own defensive needs, but also to
the protection and well-being of the entire hemisphere. This
inclusive dimension was confirmed by the subsequent concurrence
of the Organization of American States and even the participation
of some of these states in the naval operations surrounding the
55defensive quarantine.
The Methods Employed ."^"
As noted by McDougal and Feliciano:
The methods the claimant of self-defense employs in exer-
cising coercion may, like those employed by the participant
charged with having initiated unlawful aggression, comprise
any one or all — in combinations and sequences of varying
emphases — of the policy instrumentalities familiarly
categorized as diplomacy, mass communications, control over
goods and services, and armed force. Here again the rele-
vance of modality lies principally in its utility as a crude
and prima facie indicator of the general level of intensity
reached by the coercion claimed to be in self-defense and,
in equally rough evaluation, of the proportionality or
disproportionality of the allegedly responsive coercion when
_„
measured against the necessity created by the initial coercion.
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Implicit in this analysis is the requirement that the
threatened state must pursue peaceful methods of just settlement
whenever circumstances allow, and when they do not, then only the
least amount of military force necessary to effectively terminate
58
the threat may be employed. Thus the lesser the immediacy of the
threat, the greater the responsibility to exhaust peaceful reme-
dies, and regardless of the immediacy, the obligation of propor-
tionality requires that the intensity of the response be gen-
59
erally tailored to the intensity of the threat. Once the pre-
ventative purpose of self-defense is attained, further pressing
of the preemptive strike, whether for revenge, for purposes of
"teaching the other state a lesson," or for any other non-defensive
motive, may be deemed by the community of nations as an indepen-
dent act of aggression, and possibly as evidence of bad faith
60
concerning even the initial intent of the claimant.
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Conditions Surrounding the Resort to Preemptive Force .
The analysis of relevant conditions concerns both the macro-
cosm of world power allocation, alignment, and the objective
attributes of such power centers, and the microcosm of the speci-
fic circumstances more directly involved. All these conditions
impact on the reality or fallacy of the claimant state's analysis
of the condition of necessity — the condition upon which it




This is not to say that a factual necessity must in all
cases be present in order to afford an adequate basis for a
preemptive response. The "facts" as perceived by the target
state are also important, but those perceptions must prove to
have been reasonable when analyzed from the total context of
events.
The state which, for example, precipitously mobilizes on the
border and issues a short-fuse ultimatum to the neighboring state
may secretly have no intention of pressing an attack, should its
bluff fail, but if the massively orchestrated bluff produces a
preemptive strike response, the bluffing state may not easily
argue that the response was not necessitated by the apparent
conditions at hand. On the other hand, if a hypersensitive
state, on insufficient information, perceives an erroneous neces-
sity to strike first and ask questions later, it cannot expect
the community of states to accept its misguided neuralgia as a
legitimate basis for the action taken. Both fact and perception




The category of analysis concerning effects dovetails closely
with the category concerning the methods employed, both addressing
as they do the element of proportionality. Assuming that the
modality of military force is necessitated by the surrounding





must not substantially exceed, the gravity and intensity of
the threat to be repelled. The principle of economy of force is
particuarly applicable to a claimed exercise of anticipatory
self-defense, given its basis in prevention of injury to the
"self," rather than infliction of unnecessary injury to the
threatening state.
The utilization of the McDougal/Feliciano analytical frame-
work does not guarantee a correct conclusion or "foolproof"
decision-making process. Guidelines of analysis can only assist
the decision-makers, not replace them. The need for judgement
and interpretation in any process always ensures the possibility
of error or bias. What such an analytical framework does supply,
however, is a systematic, multi-factor approach, thus forcing the
decision-maker to evaluate the full fabric and complexity of the
claim, affording a broader base not only for the decision, but
for future discussion and open debate concerning the decision
itself. It is an improvement to ensure that the community pro-
cedures surrounding the analysis be consistent, even if the
,
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ultimate decision, for extraneous reasons, may not be.
IV. Case Studies: Afghanistan and Osirak
A. A preliminary PROFILE: THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Before attempting to analyze in detail the self-defense
claims of the Soviet Union and Isreal concerning Afghanistan and
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Osirak, it might be useful to initially itemize particular fac-
tors involved in the United States' response to the Cuban Missile
Crisis, for even though the Soviet Union condemned those actions
64
as "piracy," and even though Isreal and its U.S. Senate supporters
have sought to cite the United States response in 1962 as supportive
65
of their current claim, the contrasts between the 1962 quarantine
and the current claims are worthy of note.
Among the salient factors surrounding the 1962 crisis were
66
the .following:
(1) The fact of growing Soviet influence and involvement in
Cuba was patent and direct
.
(2) The evidence concerning the clandestine and rapid build-
up of nuclear weapon sites with transnational-strike capability
was carefully documented and conclusive.
(3) The evidence was expeditiously published to the world
community to allow independent analysis of the United States'
position.
(4) The security interest involved was hemispheric and the
limited actions implemented had hemisphere-wide approval.
(5) From the outset, only the minimum of force necessitated
by the circumstances was exercised. The quarantine:
(a) was implemented only after repeated warnings;
(b) was limited in geographical scope;
(c) was limited in duration;
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(d) was limited in designation of material that was to
be diverted (if cargo) or removed (if already in statu );
(e) involved only diversion, vice seizure, of shipping;
(f) involved no destruction of property or life;
(g) involved administrative procedures which minimized
the disruption of regional shipping; and
(h) was totally non-invasive, i.e. , territorial inte-
grity was never compromised. The suggestion of preemptive "sur-
gical" strikes on the missile sites was rejected by President
Kennedy and actual use of active force even on the high seas was
specifically reserved as only a last-resort option.
(6) Organs of the United Nations were advised from the
outset, its good offices were afforded opportunity to assist in
the negotiational process, and its services were sought for the
proposed on-site verification of the missiles' removal.
It is not suggested here that all of the factors listed
above were required by international law to justify the measures
taken by the United States. It is only suggested that each
played its part in ensuring the positive international response
as to the overall reasonableness of the limited measures taken
and each can be looked at as a positive precedent and a profile
against which other claims may be compared.
B. THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN '
1. Fact Description
On December 23, 1979, the CPSU official newspaper Pravda
carried an article which began with the following bold print:
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WESTERN, AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, MASS MEDIA HAVE RECENTLY
BEEN DISSEMINATING DELIBERATELY INSPIRED RUMORS ABOUT SOME
SORT OF SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL
AFFAIRS. THINGS HAVE EVEN GOTTEN AS FAR AS ALLEGATIONS THAT
SOVIET 'IpOMBAT UNITS" HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN AFGHAN TER-
RITORY. '
On December 24, these "rumors" faded into reality, as the
formal Soviet intervention into Afghanistan began, with the air-
lifting of Soviet troops and supplies continuing around the clock
throughout the 25th and 26th. On December 27th, the head of the
Afghani socialist state, President Hafizullah Amin, was over-
thrown, "tried," and executed by the new Soviet-imposed regime
led by Babrak Karmal , a former Deputy Prime Minister who had
been "exiled" abroad by the majority Khalq leadership, but who
was airlifted to Kabul from eastern Europe by the Soviets once
69
the initial intervention force had secured the capital.
On December 28th, the first official public Soviet acknow-
ledgement of the military events was made over Moscow radio,
stating:
The Government of Afghanistan, taking into consideration the
continuing widening intereference and provocation of the
country's external enemies and in order to defend the gains
of the April revolution, territorial integrity and national
independence and to maintain peace and security, and basing
itself on the treaty of friendship, good neighborliness and
cooperation of December 5, 1978, has appealed to the U.S.S.R
with an urgent request to provide immedi^^ political, moral
and
^it e
^n economic aid, including military aid.'^
The announcement was concluded with the simple statement
71that the Soviet Union had "met the request of Afghanistan."

- 37 -
On December 31st, in the first authoritative Soviet printed
explanation of the Russian involvement, Pravda provided the
following rationale:
(1) that "external imperialist forces formed a direct collu-
sion with the internal counterrevolutionary forces" in order
"to push Afghanistan off the chosen road";
(2) that internal reactionaries were "receiving unlimited
backing from the imperialist circles of the United States
and Beijing (Peking) leaders . . . lavishly supplying the
counterrevolutionary gangs with weapons, equipment, and
money"
;
(3) that the Soviet Union "will not allow Afghanistan's
being turned into a bridgehead for preparation of imperi-
alist aggression against the Soviet Union";
(4) that Amin had "teamed up with the enemies of the . . .
revolution"; and
(5) that the Soviet Government, acting under the terms of
the 1978 Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty and Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter sanctioning self-defense, granted the
Afghan Government's "insistent request" for Soviet assist-
ance and sent in a "limited Soviet military contingent" to
be used "exclusively for assistance in rebuffing the armed
interference from the outside, as these "imperialist forces"
were "determined to deprive the Afghan people of the op-
72portunity to enjoy their rights ..."
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On Janaury 12, 1980, in an interview by Pravda, Soviet
President Brezhnev reemphasized the same arguments concerning
U.S. violations of, and Soviet compliance with, international law
in relation to Afghanistan. Casting aside any accusations of
Soviet expansionism, Brezhnev reconfirmed that the "policy and
mentality of colonialism are alien to us. We do not covet the
73
lands or wealth of others."
As of July, 1981, nineteen months after the initial in-
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vasion, 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan.
2. Analysis
a. The "Invitation" Claim
If one accepts at face value the Soviet contention that its
troops were provided only at the request of the Afghani Govern-
ment, and that their continued presence is with the approval of
that Government, then no issue of anticipatory self-defense is
presented. It is not the purpose of this paper to thoroughly
analyze the "invitation" contention, but some comments are neces-
sary to put this Soviet contention in context, both general and
specific.
General Context .
Historically, the Soviet Union has relied on the "invita-
tion" contention on numerous occasions, and in each instance, the




In 1940, the Soviets' move against Finland was claimed to be
at the request of the Finnish Government, but not the Government
recognized by all nations in Helsinki. The Soviet Union claimed
that that government had abandoned the true socialist interests
of its people, and therefore Russia "recognized" a more "progres-
sive" government in the north, which requested Soviet interven-
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tion.
In 1956, the Soviets' military intervention in Hungary with
200,000 Russian troops was claimed to have been by invitation,
but not by the liberal communist government of Imre Nagy , which
was recognized by the world community, but by the "more repre-
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sentative" counter-government of Janos Kadar.
In 1968, the Warsaw Pact incursion into Czechoslovakia was
claimed to be by invitation, even though it was not until Alex-
ander Dubcek, the recognized head of the Czech government, was
removed to Moscow after the invasion that he signed a protocol
"accepting" the military "assistance," after which he was first
displaced as head of state and ultimately expelled from the Czech
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communist party.
Thus, within the Soviet outlook on international law, an
invitation need not precede the arrival of the "guest," nor must
it proceed from the duly-constituted and internationally recog-
nized Government of the "requesting" state. The "invitation" or
"request" need not even be documented and provable, because under




This presumption of invitation, which serves as a justifi-
cation for Soviet intervention any time and anywhere, stems from
three basic tenets of Soviet socialist international law: (1)
the right of national self-determination (applicable to all non-
socialist states); (2) the right of socialist self-determination
(applicable to all socialist states outside the Soviet Bloc); and
(3) the principle of socialist internationalism (applicable to
the Bloc countries). These tenets and their impact on the Soviets'
perception of the world power process merit consideration here,
as they directly relate not only to the first claim of the Soviet
Union vis-a-vis Afghanistan — i.e.
,
that Soviet presence was and
continues to be at the Afgahnis' request — but also to the much
broader issue concerning the parameters of the Soviet Union's
assertion of its right to exercise anticipatory self-defense, or
78
the so-called "bridgehead" claim.
The Soviet Concept of National Self-Determination .
Under the Soviet conceptualization of international law,
states are admitted to possess a right to sovereignty, to terri-
torial integrity, and to non-interference by external elements in
their internal affairs. Socialist states are therefore legally
insulated from any expansionist encroachment by the capitalist
nations of the West. The nations of the West, however, are not
entitled to a reciprocal level of insulation, as capitalist
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states and their sphere of client states are nonprogressive and
nonrepresentative of the true socialist interests of their citi-
79
zens.
Under the Soviet theory of national self-determination,
therefore, the concept of "state," as it applies to the West, is
expanded, and "state" recognition is extended to "progressive"
( i.e. , socialist-oriented) national liberation organizations, as
these organizations represent the popular sovereignty of the
80
suppressed masses. In light of the irreversibility of the pro-
cess of class struggle and social revolution within the cap-
italist countries, the progressive and irrepressible nature of
the national liberation organization entitles it to current
recognition as a state, even though it has not yet attained its
full political maturity. Once recognized as a "state," principles
of peaceful coexistence entitle it to socialist assistance to
fend against the capitalist interference with its sovereignty,
and thus even though the "popular" movement is occurring within
the territorial boundaries of a capitalist state, it is the
capitalist forces which are guilty of the illegal interference,
not the external socialist forces of peace which offer their
mutual assistance and support to the fledgling arm of the people.
It is true that the territory of a state is inviolable, but
territory belongs to nations and peoples, and principles of
popular sovereignty and national sovereignty require that terri-
tory be used in accordance with the "genuine" interests of the
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people. The de jure capitalist government is thereby unilat-
erally characterized as illegitimate, and one by definition




Soviet and other socialist countries' aid, including mili-
tary weaponry and manpower, to selected national liberation
organizations in states outside the socialist sphere of influence
is thus not only permitted, but is virtually obligated under the
socialist view of international law, whereas any similar move by
a capitalist state to assist a resistance movement within a
socialist state would constitute a categorical violation of
sovereignty and territorial integrity, since once a state adopts
a socialist system, an identity of interest between the people
and the government exists, and therefore the concepts of popular
sovereignty and state sovereignty coalesce, foreclosing the
possibility that any future rebellion could be anything but
reactionary, counter-revolutionary, and against the true in-
terests of the people.
The Soviet Concept of Socialist Self-Determination .
Although a capitalist state is thus legally foreclosed from
interfering in the internal affairs of a socialist state, no such
legal impediment is considered to exist when, in the perception
of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies, "assistance" is re-
quired to aid a non-Bloc socialist state which seems in danger of
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losing its socialist character. Under the doctrine of socialist
self-determination, such assistance, which might superficially
appear to be interference, is in fact cooperative support pro-
vided to protect against any interference in the socialist rights
of that waivering state's peoples and is thus a collective effort
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to protect the mutual gains of communism.
If, for example, a movement should begin within a non-Bloc
socialist government toward political pluralism or toward renewed
private ownership of exploitable property, that is, a movement
away from basic socialist principles, a violation of the people's
trust is deemed to have occurred. As an identity exists between
socialism and the best interests of the people, any slippage back
toward the bourgeois values of the past denies the people their
right to the socialist path they have "chosen." The cause of the
slippage can thus not be attributable to the people, but must be
the result of capitalist subversion, counter-revolutionary dis-
sidents and/or corrupted leadership which is no longer deserving
of the support of the people. The popular sovereignty of the
people must be protected, for it is they who are the state, and
it is they who have determined to embrace the progressive prin-
ciples of socialism.
Based upon the theoretical dichotomy between the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state, such "stabilizing"
assistance, if accomplishable by means other than military force,
may be afforded through party, vice governmental, channels, thus.
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again in theory, removing any possible implication of illegal
interference under international law, as that law proscribes such
interference only at the inter-state level.
The Soviet Concept of Socialist Internationalism .
Similar to, but more comprehensive than, the principles of
socialist self-determination, the concept of socialist inter-
nationalism defines away the basic dualism of peaceful coexist-
ence in its disparate application to the Bloc by "tempering" the
concepts of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterfer-
ence with more "progressive" principles such as mutual identity




Under the "universal" theory of peaceful coexistence, two
distinct subcategories are thus distinguished, based upon the
level of "progressiveness" that the individual state has achieved
In the West, therefore, where, as has been noted, class struggle
continues and where the true interests of the people continue to
be suppressed, principles of peaceful coexistence must provide
for on-going dialecticism and world evolution toward socialism,
and thus the concept of just wars of national liberation and the
jus cogens principle of outlawry of colonialism apply. Within
the Bloc, however, such considerations simply do not attach,
since the dialectical synthesis to a higher, more progressive
form of government has already occurred. The natural bond that
exists within the Bloc is characterized as Socialist Interna-
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tionalism, which implies a forfeiture of some of the trappings of
individual state sovereignty in favor of the collective Bloc,
based on the identity of interest and commonality of purpose that
84
these more progressive states share.
Under the broad principles of fraternal assistance, social-
ist international division of labor, and complete commonality of
interests in the furtherance of goals and objectives of communism,
the socialist states within the Bloc are deemed to have evolved
into more "selfless" sovereigns, allowing part of their independ-
ence to wither away in favor of collective self-determination.
Matters become internal to the Bloc, not internal to the indi-
vidual state, as each Bloc state must conduct both its foreign
and domestic affairs in consonance with the collective harmony of
the whole. Further, since the Soviet Union is the most experi-
enced in the building of communism, it ipso facto (or more appro-
priately, ipse dixit ) becomes the senior partner in determining
85
what is "harmonious" and what is not.
With each of the doctrines outlined above — national self-
determination, socialist self-determination, and socialist inter-
nationalism — the result can be seen to be the same: that the
victory of socialism, under the Soviet approach to international
law, is a one-way street. Wherever capitalism exists, the people
retain their right to exercise self-determination in favor of
socialism, but wherever socialism exists, the right is already
deemed to have been irrevocably exercised, permitting of external
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intercession only by other socialist countries in the common
quest of protecting the permanence of the choice.
It might be noted that the same principles of socialist
collectivity operate domestically within the U.S.S.R. Given the
Soviet Union's status as the largest geographical country in the
or; 0'7
worlcT, and possessing as it does some 170 ethnic components, the
centralizing concept of "socialist patriotism" is a practical as
well as ideological necessity if ethnic egocentrism and intrana-
tional factionalism are to be avoided. The would-be sovereignty
of the Union Republics must be defeased, and the essence of cen-
tralism must control over the appearance of federalism. Form is
significant only in its pragmatical effect ( e.g. , to justify U.N.
88
membership for the Ukraine and Byelorussia); form has no signi-
ficance when it might interfere with the absolute control by the
89
Party/State. A Union Republic might have a "right" to secede,
but to exercise that "right" would be contrary to the best in-
terests of socialism, and therefore subject to immediate infusion
of federal "assistance."
Thus, regardless of the location in which a movement might
90begin, the Soviet concepts of international law afford the U.S.S.R,
the flexibility necessary to justify its interference for the
promotion, or the enforcement, of socialist goals. If, in Trans-
caucasia, an ethnic Armenian uprising were to occur, such a move-
ment could be brutally suppressed within the Armenian Soviet
Socialist Republic, and actively supported across the frontier in
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Turkey, all under the "universality" of peaceful coexistence and
the Soviet East-West analysis of "self-determination."
Given the above discussion, concerning both the historical
and ideological background of the Soviet conception of "requested
assistance," the general credibility of the Soviet claim of same
in the specific instance of Afghanistan would already seem margi-
nal. When one then analyzes the specific facts surrounding the
alleged Afghan invitation, the credibility of that claim becomes
nil
.
As noted above, the recognized Afghani Government on the eve
of the Soviet intervention was headed by Hafizullah Amin, who had
91
recently survived a coup attempt by Nur Mohammed Taraki. Both
men were powerful leaders within the nationalistic Khalq faction
of the socialist forces which had established the Democratic
92
Republic of Afghanistan in 1978. Although the coup attempt by
Taraki was assumed to have been supported by the Soviets (as
Taraki had just come from a stopover in Moscow and Amin was known
to be considered "too independent" by the Kremlin), the Soviets
continued to publically support Amin after Taraki died in the
93
aborted coup. Just 90 days later, however, on the 24th of Decem-
ber 1979, the massive airlift of Soviet troops began, and within
three days, Amin was overthrown and executea oy a new Soviet-
imposed regime led by Babrak Karmal, a member of the more doc-
95
trinaire Parcham faction of the Afghani socialist movement. As
stated earlier, Karmal and other Parcham leaders had been air-
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lifted to the Afghani capital of Kabul from Eastern Europe by the
Soviets, but only after the capital was under effective Soviet
control.
Thus once again the Soviet Union, upon announcing that its
"assistance" had been "repeatedly requested," was asking the
world to believe (a) that the recognized Afghani head of state
had requested external assistance in effecting his own execution;
(b) that a group of "exiled" Afghanis had the right to request
Russian "assistance" without the approval of the recognized
Afghani government in Kabul; or (c) that the Soviet Union uni-
laterally had the right to act upon the legal fiction of a
"standing invitation," in its self-perceived role as the guardian
of the true principles of socialism and its acute ear for hearing
the real wishes of the people, vice the wishes of the interna-
tionally recognized government of Afghanistan.
As might be expected, the world was somewhat less than con-
vinced. On January 14, 1980, by a vote of 104 to 18, the com-
munity of nations, sitting as a body in the U.N. General Assembly,
adopted a stiffly worded resolution that "strongly deplored" the
invasion and called for an "immediate, unconditional, and total
96
withdrawal" of foreign troops, and the Third World, with its
?1decision-making advantage of being neutral, voted 78 in favor of





b. The "Bridgehead Claim .
Perhaps realizing that it had played its "invitation" card
far too often, the Soviet Union inserted into its official list
of additional justifications (see p. 37 above) at least one that
appeared to involve a claim of a defensive right vested directly
in the Soviet Union, i.e. , that regardless of whether the alleged
violations of Afghani sovereignty by the "interference from the
outside" had not alarmed the Afghani government sufficiently into
calling for collective defensive assistance from the Soviets, the
Soviets had a right to unilaterally take whatever action they
deemed necessary, including the invasion of a sovereign neighbor,
to counter those "imperialist forces." As stated in the Soviet
Union's official explanation, the Soviet Union "will not allow
Afghanistan's being turned into a bridgehead for preparation of
99imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union." This unila-
teral security interest was further amplified during the inter-
view of Leonid Brezhnev by Pravda on 12 January 1980, where he
provided an elaboration of the "bridgehead" claim as follows:
"Acting otherwise would have meant passively watching the crea-
tion on our southern border of a source of serious danger to the
security of the Soviet state."
Thus in the absence of any credibility to the "invitation"
claim, the fallback claim becomes one of a right to the exercise
of anticipatory self-defense, to prevent the possible creation of
an ideologically unfriendly state on Russia's southern flank.
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To fully evaluate this latter claim, the McDougal/Feliciano
analytical framework will be applied below to the salient factors
involved in the Afghani question.
Participants .
The central participants are clearly the Soviet Union and
Afghanistan, the former a world superpower and the latter a
minimum power force. According to the Soviet "outside threat"
theory, the United States and the People's Republic of China
102
would also be considered participants, the former being the other
major world superpower and the latter being a substantial world
power if only due to its large geographical and population base
and its military potential. The claim that these countries
constitute additional, and in the eyes of the Soviet Union,
pivotal participants in the Afghani question has in the last 19
months been supported by the claimant with almost no concrete
evidence. In comparison with the clear photographic documenta-
tion provided by the United States during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the Soviet Government has relied only on stock phrase-
ologies. This lack of concrete proof is especially noteworthy,
considering that the official explanation in Pravda had specifi-
cally stated that the "imperialist circles of the United States
103
and Beijing" had " lavishly "^ supplied guns and equipment to the
"internal reactionaries," and given the magnitude and profes-
sionalism of the Soviet intelligence system, one would assume




lavish program could easily be obtained.
It is interesting to note also that repeated independent
press reports coming from within Afghanistan have documented the
facts to be the exact opposite of the claim, in that the vast
majority of the weaponry of modern vintage utilized by the Afghani
guerrillas, or mujahaddin, are of Soviet , vice Western or Chinese,
manufacture, with Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles and Soviet-




The weapons reportedly come from two sources: (1) materiel
captured in skirmishes with Soviet or Afghani army troops or in
clandestine raids; and more importantly (2) material supplied
directly by the massive defection of soldiers from the Soviet-
equipped Afghani army^ Estimates of the size of the Afghani army
prior to the Soviet incursion ranged from 80,000 to 100,000;
107
current estimates set the number at perhaps 20,000. Further
reports coming out of Afghanistan reflect that the defection
problem is so acute and the loyalty of the remaining Afghani army
to the current Karmal regime so questionable that almost all
Afghani troops have been transferred away from the capital of
Kabul (which is now "protected" almost exclusively by Soviet
IQO
forces X", and issuance of Soviet weaponry such as handheld SAM
anti-aircraft launchers to the Afghani army has been completely
terminated, since these weapons consistently end up in the hands
of the mujahaddin, who put them to good use against the Soviet's
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major ace-in-the-hole for mountain warfare, the MIG24 helicopter
gunship.
When one compares these reports to the Soviet claim of
lavish imperialist involvement, the claim seems transparent at
best. Such factual analysis however is inconsequential from the
Soviet ideological viewpoint, for just as they feel the right to
presume an "invitation" for "fraternal assistance," they likewise
presume the existence of imperialist aggression. This presump-
tion stems from the same Marxist-Leninist concepts discussed
above: the irrepressible struggle of the masses against the
colonial and neocolonial masters, the inherent aggression of the
imperialist forces, the world-wide confrontation between the
reactionary forces of war and the socialist forces of peace, and
the vanguard position of the CPSU in leading the forces of peace
and in interpreting the true principles of communism. Lavish
imperialist support for any counterrevolutionary movement need
not be verified; under Soviet ideology it is a given.
The world decision-making process, however, deals not with
ideology, but with objectivity and universality. The Soviet
claim must be held up to the same standard of proof as required
of any other claimant, and its claim as to the expanded partici-





(1) Inclusive or exclusive.
Viewing the Soviet claim as a unilateral right to exer-
cise a preemptive act of force in the protection of the security
of its southern border, its increasingly more permanent incursion
into Afghanistan appears to serve no inclusive interests, re-
gional or otherwise. The actions were deemed necessary to insu-
112
late its borders, its territorial integrity. Further, once the
claim concerning an "invitation" is rejected for lack of a factual
basis, the necessary implication arises that the Soviet security
needs take precedent over the sovereign rights and territorial
integrity of Afghanistan. If one follows the Soviet claim to its
natural conclusion, the world legal order is being asked to
subscribe to the contention that the Soviet Union may exercise
massive force as a valid defensive action against another nation
whenever, in its ideological perception, that neighboring country
poses a potential for adopting a governmental form deemed un-
friendly by the Russians. The benefit of such a contention is
exclusive solely to the Soviet Union, and flies in the face of
the inclusive values underlying the principle of the sovereign
equality of states.
It might be further noted that, whereas in the Cuban Missile
Crisis the inclusive hemispheric aspect of the United States'
actions were concurred in by both the OAS and the NATO allies, in
the instance of Afghanistan the presence of Soviet troops has
113
even been questioned by a number of other communist movements.
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(2) Conservation or extension.
As has been succinctly stated by Professor W.T. Mallison:
The national objectives of the nation-state claiming lawful
self-defense should be appraised in terms of the genuineness
of the element of conservation of values as opposed to their
extension. The self-defense concept on its face involves
conservation of values rather than destruction or acquisi-
tion of values of the opposing participant.-^'^
Nineteen months after the initial incursion, the Soviet pre-
sence and control in Afghanistan is undiminished. The facts re-
flect a drastic extension of Soviet values at the cost of Afghani
political independence, as massive invasion has become prolonged
occupation. Russian ambitions concerning control of Afghanistan
date back well into the 19th century, when the expanisionism of
the tzars confronted the colonialism of the British empire". The
Soviet Union cannot expect the world to accept the new ideological
explanation, when it functionally compares so closely with Russia's
imperialist past.
(3) Consequentiality of the Values Sought to be Protected.
If the issue at hand dealt with an immediate threat to
the very survival of the Soviet Union, that very high level of
consequentiality would certainly have justified some defensive
action. If, for example, the United States, in complicity with
the Government of Afghanistan, were to have clandestinely launched
a massive build-up of transnational-range nuclear missile sites
in the Hindu Kush north of Kabul, aimed at, and with a striking
capability extending to, the Ural Mountains deep within the
Soviet state, the precedent of the Cuban Missile Crisis would
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militate in favor of justifying a Soviet defensive response
similar to the limited actions employed in 1962 by the United
States and its hemispheric neighbors.
The "threat" perceived by the Soviet Union in the Afghani-
stan instance, however, is many times removed from the above
hypothetical, as the Soviets appear to claim an anticipatory
right to defend against the potential of even an alliance be-
tween Afghanistan and the United States. Again, in the words
quoted from Pravda: the Soviet Union "will not allow Afghani-
stan's being turned into a bridgehead for preparation of imperi-
116
alist aggression against the Soviet Union." Reflecting back to
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and recalling that the Soviet Union
termed the limited actions taken by the United States "piracy,"
such a claim would mean that the unacceptability of the threat,
and the necessity for far more invasive action, arrived not when
the missiles were emplaced, not even when Castro actually adopted
a socialist form of government and embraced the Soviet Union, but
even before that, at the point when the potential for such a
change of events arose.
Suffice it to say that the community of nations is not
willing to discard the principles of territorial integrity and
political independence of states in favor of such an unlimited
principle of individual state security. The consequentiality of





The Methods Employed .
Given the conjectural and distant nature of the threat per-
ceived by the Soviet Union to its security, the principle of
proportionality and the lack of immediacy would dictate that
peaceful avenues of resolution be utilized. Whether by diplo-
matic demarche between individual governments, referral of the
matter to an organ of the United Nations for appropriate consi-
deration, by political protest, or by economic initiative, the
Soviet Union was free to air the perceived grievance and attempt
to accomplish its resolution by methods consistent with world
public order. Instead it continued to publicly support the Amin
117
regime after the ill-fated coup attempt in September of 1979,
such support itself being an indication of the low order of the
"threat" to which the Soviet Union was quietly preparing to
coercively respond.
Eschewing any peaceful or even limited coercive alterna-
tives, the Soviets chose as their first response an intensity of
coercion that the intensity of the "threat" would not have war-
ranted even as a last resort. Even if one assumed, for the sake
of argument, that the consequentiality of the security interest
claimed was adequate and that the necessity for some defensive
action was present, no justification for the quantum of coercion
exercised, and which continues to be exercised, can be extracted
from any objective reading of the facts. The "piracy" of the
limited quarantine in 1962 is quite pallid in comparison with the
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invasion and occupation of a sovereign neighbor by 100,000 Soviet
troops
.
Conditions Surrounding the Resort to Preemptive Force .
The most important condition requisite to any lawful exer-
cise of anticipatory coercion is the presence of an adequate
degree of necessity under the circumstances presented. As dis-
cussed above, the "bridgehead" apprehension of the Soviets as to
potential "imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union" was
little more than a conjectural worst-case analysis. A socialist
regime which it publically supported was still in power in Kabul,
the civil war that was continuing in the Afghani mountains had
been going on at a relatively steady level of intensity for some
time, and the "enemies of the revolution" were not imperalistic
,
but Islamicr. If the Amin government suffered from any major
instability, the cause was neither the West nor Islam, but rather
the political infighting between the socialist factions them-
selves". No dramatic shift in this state of affairs, no element
of intense immediacy, and no cry of Russian alarm, precursed the
Soviet decision to intervene.
The facts do clearly indicate that the Soviet Union was
secretly displeased with Prime Minister Amin, and that the events
in Iran, coupled with the Islamic threat that the mujahaddin
posed to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, was causing the
Soviet leadership no insubstantial amount of concern due to the




million muslims in nearby Soviet Socialist Republics, but neither
displeasure over foreign leadership nor concern over domestic
religious problems provides a state with a degree of necessity
upon which to predicate an immediate and intense external re-
sponse of invasion. (Nor, it might be added, do either of these
latter factual concerns have much to do with a fictional claim of
an imminent imperial bridgehead.
)
The initial determination concerning the presence of the
element of necessity lies with the threatened state, but if that
state is to convince the ultimate decision-makers of the reason-
ableness of its determination, it must produce for the community-





the highly intense response exercised by
the Soviet Union bore no relationship to the remote and conjec-
tural threat perceived. Even assuming, arguendo , that the threat
to Soviet security merited a coercive response, the immediate
election of any extremely high intensity of force and the pro-
longed application thereof in no way comported with the gravity
of that security threat. Limited actions to protect the imme-
diate area of the Soviet border, or limited peripheral raids to
interdict the supposed "lavish" flow of imperialist supplies,
were never attempted. Elected instead was what might be called
the "Axis approach" to problem solving: the massive infusion of
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force, the overthrow of the established government, and the
creation of a Quisling regime, which then "requests" the foreign
military force to remain to "protect" it.
Further, the fact that the Soviets remain in full force in
Afghanistan after 19 months can only serve to detract even more
from the credibility of any claim that the original intent of the
121
incursion was based on considerations of self-defense. The
underpinnings of self-defense are grounded in protection, not
extension, of national values.
Analysis of the Afghani question under the McDougal/Feliciano
multi-factor framework leads to a clear conclusion: that the
Soviet incursion and continued presence in Afghanistan cannot be
justified under any legitimate claim of self-defense, whether
viewed from the standpoint of necessity or proportionality. The
ultimate decision-makers, sitting as the United Nations General
Assembly, have twice, by overwhelming majorities, concurred in
122
this conclusion.
In spite of this international condemnation, the Soviet
Union continues to reject international proposals of a negotiated
settlement that would allow for the withdrawal of its troops,
even proposals that would guarantee international neutrality for
Afghanistan and thus remove the potential "threat" of an imperi-
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alist bridgehead, which supposedly was the precipitator and
remains the raison d'etre for the Soviet presence. The reason
for the refusal of the Soviet Union to negotiate is tragically
ironic: the world community will not commit itself in advance to
123
recognize the legitimacy of the Karmal regime.
The irony stems from the tenets of the Soviet ideology dis-
cussed above, for Soviet military interventions have consistently
been coupled with a recognition of a request from the true arm of
the people, not the "reactionary" established leadership who
have become "enemies of the revolution." Thus the Soviets have
built a cordon sanitaire of obedient satellite states through a
practice of "derecognizing" the leadership of the state it wishes
to invade, but now it cannot understand how the world community
124
can attempt to interfere in the "internal affairs" of Afghanistan
by refusing to agree in advance to recognize the regime that the
125
Soviets — for now — choose to support.
Afghanistan continues to be a political disaster for Russia,
especially in the Third Worla, C)ut the Soviet goose must continue
to cook because the world gander dares to require "equal rights"
regarding recognition.
C. ISRAEL AND OSIRAK
1
. Fact Description
(Isreal, invoking national security considerations, has
refused to comment on much of the detail concerning its aerial
attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor site outside of the Iraqi
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capital of Baghdad. The following brief reconstruction of what
transpired is a distillation taken from various newspaper sources.)
On June 7, 1981, an Israeli aerial-attack force took off
127
from Etzion Air Base, heading south into the Gulf of Aqaba. The
force consisted of some six F15 fighters and eight F16 fighter
128
bombers, all of United States manufacture and all provided to
Israel under a standing 1952 agreement requiring that such weap-
onry "be used solely to maintain its internal security, legiti-
mate self-defense of areas of which it is part, or in the United
129
Nations collective security agreements . . . . "^ The attack force
13Q
swung east across the northern portion of Saudia Arabia (and
131
perhaps portions of southern Jordan;, with the Israeli pilots
using Arabic in their communications to avoid detection of their
132identity. Just before sundown, and after having traversed more
than 1000 miles of Arab airspace, the attack force approached the
Iraqi nuclear reactor site of Osirak near Baghdad and commenced a
high altitute raid using 2000-pound conventional bombs, causing
133
severe damage to the complex. The Osirak plant was still in the
i34 The
raid lasted approximately two minutes, with the attack force re-
turning by an undisclosed route to Israel (the shortest distance




More than 24 hours passed before any official Israeli an-
136
nouncement of the raid was made, reportedly because Israel be-
lieved that Iraq might be too embarrassed to disclose the success
of the Israeli strike. The Israeli Government finally made the
announcement after stating that a report of the raid had been
137
made earlier on Radio Jordan.
In announcing the attack, Prime Minister Menachem Begin
stated that the action was conducted in "supreme, legitimate
self-defense." "Israeli justifications for the necessity of the
preemptive action and its timing were as follows:
(1) that the Osirak plant was intended to produce nuclear
weapons,-^
(2) that a secret chamber had been built 40 meters under the
reactor so that bombs could be made there without detection
140by the International Atomic Energy Agency ("I.A.E.A."),
(3) that Iraq had refused to allow the I.A.E.A. to inspect
the reactor; -^
(4) that I.A.E.A. safeguards and inspection techniques were
inadequate in any event to detect potential diversion of
bomb-grade radioactive material;
(5) that the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, had stated
in the Baghdad newspaper Al Thawra on October 4, 1980: "The
Iranian People should not fear the nuclear reactor, which is





(6) that France and Italy had been corrupted by their need
for oil and thus had cooperated with Iraq without imposing
adequate safeguards to ensure that the plant would only be
144
used for peaceful purposes;
(7) that United States intelligence officials informed
145
Israel that Iraq was preparing a nuclear bomb soon;
(8) that the reactor was scheduled to become "critical" (go
on line) as soon as early July, and thus no further delay of
146
the attack was possible;
(9) that the bombing of the plant before it became critical
involved humanitarian considerations, as Baghdad, only 12
147
miles away, might otherwise be showered with radioactivity;
(10) that the attack was conducted on a Sunday to ensure
that the French technicians would not be working and thus
148
not subject to injury;
(11) that Israel had tried to use every diplomatic avenue
available;
(12) that no ceasefire or armistice had ever been agreed to
between Iraq and Israel, and thus a "technical state of war"
150
existed dating back to 1947;
151
(13) that Iraq refused to recognize Israel's right to exist;
(14) that even President Kennedy had stated during the
Cuban Missile Crisis: "We live in a world in which not only
152pulling the trigger is an imminent danger to war";
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(15) that the reactor posed a mortal threat to the very
153
survival of Israel; and
(16) that the Israeli Government would never allow a repeat
of the Nazi holocaust, and that to allow a nuclear bomb to
hit Tel Aviv could be likened to the poisoning of Jewish
154
children in the gas chambers of the Nazis.
Concerning the reasonableness of the actions taken, Deputy
Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori stated: "The definition of
Israel's defense will be decided by Israel's government and not
155.
by any other government, no matter how friendly." The overall
Israeli position was reflected in a statement by Prime Minister
Begin, in what might be called the Begin Doctrine: Israel will
not permit "any enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction
156
against the people of Israel."
2. Analysis .
In no reported instance subsequent to the aerial attack has
the Israeli Government made any direct or indirect reference to
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in justifying its claim
157
concerning self-defense. This may be due to at least two diverse
reasons: (1) it may have realized that its main supplier and
almost sole international supporter, the United States, has at
158least officially adopted the restrictive view of that article,
and since the facts involved do not approach an "armed attack" by
Iraq or even the imminent threat thereof, a claim to self-defense
versed under Article 51 of the Charter would only have compli-
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cated Israel's efforts toward persuasion of the United States as
to the legality of Israel's actions; and (2) the invocation of
the Charter here would be inconsistent with Israel's consistent
policy of downplaying the importance and credibility of the
United Nations in general, as Israel, like South Africa, feels
that the United Nations has compromised its objectivity in its
respective case, for example by officially recognizing and granting
159 2.60
official observer status to the PLC) and SWAPCT.
Regardless of whether Israel looks to the Charter or looks
through the Charter (via the word "inherent" in Article 51) to
the underlying customary law of nations, the critical elements
necessary for the validity of any claim to anticipatory self-
defense remain the same: necessity and proportionality.
These elements, as they apply to the Israeli claim, will
first be analyzed generally under the McDougal/Feliciano frame-
work, and then as they pertain seriatim to the 16 individual
justifications outlined supra.
Participants .
The core participants are clearly Israel and Iraq. The
State of Israel is unquestionably the relative superpower in the
Middle East. It possesses the most highly trained fighting force
and the highest level of American-supplied firepower in the
entire region. Iraq is a military power but of markedly lesser
status, and its primary source of weaponry, the Soviet Union, has

- 66 -
recently strained its ties with Iraq by associating itself more
closely with Syria and by expressing neutrality concerning Iraq's
161
ongoing conflict with the revolutionary government of Iran. That
conflict has also drained Iraq militarily, thus widening the
162
relative power gap between itself and Israel even further. To
compare the participants in one other pertinent dimension, Iraq
163
is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT")
and is a participating member in the I.A.E.A. safeguard program;
Israel is a signatory to neither.
The discussion of participants cannot, however, end there.
Saudi Arabia (and, depending upon the route of the Israeli attack
force, Jordan) may be considered as involuntarily participating,
for its/their airspace was utilized as a flight path by the
164
Israelis for access to Iraq.
Further, the question must be raised as to the participant
status of the United States, even if one assumes that it had no
advance knowledge of, and gave no explicit consent to, the Israeli
action. Without the massive United States economic and military
aid that has been and remains the very power base of the State of
Israel, it would not possess the means nor the confidence to
165
attempt an Osirak operation. This is not to say that vicarious
state responsibility attaches simply because of a "but for"
scenario, but where the Maecenas State continues its level of
generosity after becoming aware over a period of time of repeated
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abuse being made of the support provided, especially under a
166
pattern of constantly expanding claims to self-defense, then at
some point the lack of advance knowledge by the Maecenas of an
action under an even broader defense claim no longer entails a
presumption of lack of indirect responsibility. At some point
the sponsor state must be confronted with the common law doctrine
of respondiat superior. Israel has associated itself with that
doctrine, for example, in its commando raid on Beirut Airport in
-I r^
1968. That raid served to penalize the Government of Lebanon for
its claimed continued support of Paelstinian terrorism. The
specifically stated purpose of the raid in 1968 was to punish the
supporter enough so that the support might stop, since without
that support the illegal activities of those supported might
168likewise be forced to stop. The shoe is now on the other foot,
and the international community has a right to look to the United
169States to see if the shoe fits.
Objectives .
(1) Inclusive or exclusive.
Prime Minister Begin has mixed few words in expressing
the exclusivity of the Israeli claim. When asked about regional
reaction, he stated: "I don't care about the Arab world. I care
about our lives. "^ ^e later commented: "I must concern myself
with the people of Israel
. . . and everything else is peripheral




(2) Conservation or extension.
If one for the moment assumes that an imminent threat of
high intensity did exist and that the only defensive alternative
available was the use of armed force, then the "surgical" nature
of the aerial raid could be considered as comporting with the
positive principle of maximizing the conservation of common
values. (Those pivotal assumptions, however, appear unfounded,
as will be discussed in detail infra . ) No critical threat to
Iraqi political independence was involved; no occupation force
implanted; no damage inflicted beyond the destruction of the
precise source of the perceived threat.
Even if one accepts, however, the argument of a "technical
state of war" (which will also be discussed in more detail infra )
to validate the "defensive" coercion imposed upon Iraq, a more
difficult question concerning extension of values arises in
relation to the violation of "nonbelligerent" airspace. Israel's
intentional overflight of Saudi (and perhaps Jordanian) territory
implies a further claim by Israel: that it has the right to
ignore the sovereignty of a neutral state in order to gain access
172
to its enemy's position. The community of states, and Belgium in
particular, might find such unilateral extension of rights dis-
turbing, as it takes as its premise the same principles of
Notrecht that Germany attempted to claim as a defense in both
World Wars. Israel's repeated condemnation of Nazi atrocities
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is well-taken, but that must include the Nazi practice of cal-
culated violations of neutral rights under international law.
It might also be noted that during the 1973 Yom Kippur War,
the United States respected the airspace rights of its NATO
allies who refused to cooperate in the efforts to resupply Israel
in the "defense" of its occupied territories. Only Portugal
consented to the use of its facilities as a stopover point for
the United States supply line, and only Portugese facilities were
173
in fact used.
The solution to Israel's dilemma concerning military access
to Iraq in time of "war" is not to disregard the sovereign rights
of other intervening states, but to finally and forthcomingly re-
solve the question of Palestinian self-determination and sover-
eignty, for that may well dispel any need for military access to
Iraq. Israel might claim that such is idle idealism, but it is
the essence of realism in comparison to any contention that
Israel can continue to survive by, and continue to expect United
States support for, further bombings of the Osiraks of the future.
(3) Consequentiality of the Values Sought to be Protected.
As was stated in the multi-factor analysis of the Afghani
question, the consequentiality of the very survival of a state is
extremely high. If Israeli survival were imminently threatened,
its right to exercise proportional defensive measures to effect
the termination of that threat would be unquestioned. But just
as in the comparison of the Afghani situation to the Cuban Missile
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Crisis, the Israeli contentions concerning an imminent threat to
survival do not comport with other admitted facts. Unlike the
Cuban Missile Crisis, no missile sites were on the Iraqi horizon,
no nuclear warheads were in place (or even in production).
The Begin Doctrine and the Bridgehead Doctrine do not require
that. Both claim the right to prevent even the potential of
such. Again, in Mr. Begin 's words: Israel will not permit "any




Even if each and every one of the 16 assertions of Israel
itemized above were accepted as true, the first actual comple-
tion of a nuclear weapon by Iraq, even by the most liberal of
Israeli estimates, was more than a year away. To take such a
conjecture, with its hypothetical imminence of a year hence,
and to put it next to the photographic facts of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, and then to discern in the former instance an immediate
need for a higher intensity of coercive response than was taken
in the latter, is to ascribe to the Israeli people a right to
175geometrically greater security than any other nation.
Insecurity is inherent in sovereignty. The right to anti-
cipatory self-defense is not available to alleviate that inse-
curity when time and opportunity remain for attempting peaceful,
and hopefully more permanent, solutions.

- 71 -
The Methods Employed .
The Government of Israel claimed that diplomatic and other
peaceful modalities for resolving the perceived threat had been
thoroughly exhausted and that preemptive force was the only just
course of resolution that remained open. Unfortunately for the
credibility of that contention, one does not have to look far to
find at least three diplomatic avenues which were avialable but
unutilized.
(1) The nation that Israel decried as being primarily re-
sponsible for the introduction of nuclear technology in Iraq was
France, and yet even though a new French Government had recently
been installed which was markedly more sympathetic to the Govern-
ment of Israel and markedly less sympathetic to nuclear prolifera-
tion, Israel made no honest attempt to contact that new govern-
ment on possible peaceful initiations before launching its raid
on the still uncompleted reactor. The public affairs office of
the Israeli Foreign Ministry, when asked why this positive poli-
tical development was not pursued, stated only that Israel made
no distiction between the governments of Giscard and Mitterand
177
and that "for us, it is a continuous government."
Such a bland and disinterested appraisal of such a major
178
political development, with such direct relevance to the specific
threat perceived, can only serve to underline, in a different
dimension, the conclusiveness of the Israeli Defense Ministry's
comment quoted above concerning Israel's perception of its de-
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fense rights being exclusively a matter for Israeli determina-
tion. It simply made no difference what France might have been
able to immediately effect in concessions from Iraq; Israel would
not trust those safeguards any more than any other safeguards not
imposed directly by Israel . Diplomacy is thus a non-option from
the outset, for diplomacy requires cooperation with other states,
and Israel does not trust any other state. Only its "safeguard"
program would satisfy it — destruction.
(2) It was a well known fact at the time of Israel's decision
to bomb that the influence of the United Staes in Iraq was on the
179
ascendency, given the growing strains on Iraqi-Soviet relations,
and that the new American administration saw positive opportunities
for a new Mideastern intiative to achieve a reorientation of the
region away from the Soviet camp. Given this new United States
window of influence in Iraq, one might expect Israel to turn to
the United States, its only consistent supporter, to attempt to
put pressure on the Iraqis and the French for additional measures
180
in "pacifying" the Osirak nuclear complex. But, once again, such
an alternative would require diplomacy and trust, and thus falls
victim to the same Israeli position of unilateralism discussed
above
.
Israel is quick to refer to the United States as an "ally,"
but the term is not appropriate, for an alliance implies a two-
way street. Israel approaches the United States strictly from a

- 73 -
"supply-side" perspective, demanding massive arms and aid while
simultaneously insisting on the right to jeopardize vital Ameri-
can strategic and economic interests whenever and where ever it
chooses. The Israeli concept of "alliance" is as elastic as its
concept of self-defense, and it is a true testimony to Israel's
self-imposed isolation that it has no trust even in its only
"ally," who has long given it unquestioned and unquestioning
support for its ever-expanding perspective of "self-defense."
It has been exactly 25 years since an American president,
Dwight David Eisenhower, forced Israel to recognize and respect
the constraints of international law. It is perhaps ironic that
the reason that Israel (and much of the world) does not trust the
United States is due to the international naiveness of America,
and the naiveness is no more graphically reflected than in its
181
blank-check approach to Israel over the last quarter of a century.
(3) The third diplomatic alternative disregarded by Israel
implicates the inconsistency at the very core of the Israeli
arguments concerning the inadequacy of international nuclear
safeguards. It is strained indeed for a country to defend a
coercive act on the basis of the shortcomings of an international
regulatory process, when that country has never joined in, or
even attempted to cooperative with, that same regulatory process.
If Israel were truly concerned with the improvement of the system
of international safeguards, it would sign the NPT and work
within the I.A.E.A. system. It is difficult for a nation to
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argue the necessity for coercive force due to a possible poten-
tial for abuse of certain international regulatory standards,




Israel is thus demanding not only that it be allowed to
possess the bomb while coercively deterring that option to others,
but it is regaling an international regulatory system for inade-
quately protecting it, while it does nothing to even afford the
agency an opportunity to assist it. It is a basic claim to
rights without responsibilities, sovereignty without reciprosity.
Conditions Surrounding the Resort to Preemptive Force .
Israel is certainly correct that the central issue of
necessity must be resolved in each instance by the threatened
state. To demand that this determination be conclusive, however,
and not subject to world community review, is to demand the uni-
183
lateral domestication of all rules of international conduct.
Once each state is granted to be bound only by its own judgement,
it is effectively bound by no law at all.
Given Israel's lack of trust for Europe, for America, for
the I.A.E.A., for the United Nations, or for anything else except
its own coercive exercises in self-help, it is little wonder that
Israel perceived the presence of imminent necessity concerning
184
Osirak. Under such a perception of universal persecution, neces-
sity for coercion is presumed and continuing, just like the
element of a "standing invitation" under Soviet ideology.
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If only Israel is to judge Israel's action, then one must
wonder why Israel even bothers to explain its actions. What
sense does it make to claim a legal basis for one's conduct, when
one is both the claimant and the decision-maker for that claim,
and the decision has already been made.
Each of Israel's 16 justifications will be analyzed subse-
quently, but the philosophical question remains: who is Israel
even trying to convince by those justifications if it is to be
its own judge. The answer seems relatively clear, it must be
185
trying, with increasingly less success, to convince itself.
Effects .
Once the necessity of coercive action was perceived by
Israel, the quantum of force elected was at least of less in-
tensity, of less permanence, and of less destruction of life than
186
exercised by it on numerous occasions in the past. But this
relative factor of proportionality is not only irrelevant to the
issue of factual proportionality, which will be discussed in
connection with the analysis of the 16 proffered justifications,
it is of insignificant importance in comparison with the greater
issue of effects raised by the aerial attack — the precedential
impact of the action on the future conduct (or misconduct) of
states.
The post-war years have witnessed a gradual and painstaking
accommodation by the community of nations to the undesirable, but
as yet unavoidable, application of "balance of power" principles
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as the fundamental deterrence mechanism to nuclear weapons' use.
The accumulation of second strike capability has been established
as the key to nuclear defense, for that capability ensures notice
to one's opponent that the stakes are too high, that In-itiation
of a nuclear attack is in effect suicidal. The world has chosen
to live with this insecurity, for it is the mutuality of that in-
security that has made it so singularly successful.
Israel has now announced to the world a new alternative:
develop nuclear weapons of one's own and then bomb anyone who
might attempt to do likewise; demand the right for a personal
nuclear option, and then destroy the facilities of anyone who
might demand an equal rights
This alternative might not be so singularly unreasonable
if one were to accept the Israeli position that its situation is
unique and that its need for security is superior to that of any
other member of the community of states, but international law
stands for the antithesis of preferential treatment: in the eyes
of that law, there can be no "chosen" nation.
Pakistan, for example, is equally dwarfed by the size of its
less-than-cordial neighbors: to the southeast is nuclear India,
with whom it has gone through as many wars and border battles as
Israel with the Arab states, and from whom it is similarly di-
188
vided by historical claims and religious fervor; to the North
lies the Soviets in Afghanistan, bound by friendship treaty to




potential of Pakistan; and to the West is the fanaticism of
Iran, with its claim to being the vanguard of the Islamic , not
just the Iranian, Revolution. Once Pakistan joins the unofficial
nuclear club, may it satisfy a portion of its insecurity by
bombing the nuclear reactor at Tarapur? Or what of Taiwan, or
South Korea, or Lybia? Every state is insecure and every state
is unique. That is precisely why each state cannot be the ulti-
mate judge of its own conduct, for an unrestrained right to
"defend" against insecurity leads directly to a law of the
jungle; a jungle now equipped with ICBM's.
The 16 Jusitifcations.
As has been noted, even if each and every justification for
the raid were true, the element of immediate necessity, which is
so critical to the legal exercise of anticipatory coercive force,
would seem to be lacking. This lacking is compounded, once those
16 justifications are held up to objective analysis.
190
(1) Osirak was "an atomic bomb-producing plant."
This description of the Osirak plant by Prime Minister
Begin is at a minimum inarticulate, for at the time of the attack,
the plant was not producing anything, let alone atomic bombs.
When the contention is reworded to read "once the plant is
operable, its intended purpose is to attempt to produce weapons
-
grade material, which, once the necessary technology and scien-
tific know-how ace mastered, will be used for the manufacture of
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atomic bombs at some indefinite point in the future," much of the
claimed imminent-threat impact immediately dissipates, and thus
it may be assumed that Mr. Begin 's formulation is not inarticulate,
but intentional. Even reworded, however, the contention consti-
tutes only a subjective Israeli analysis of Iraqi intent, which
the world community, in its decision-making role, must carefully
evaluate using the objective facts present. Israel thus sub-
mitted justifications (2) through (8) as "proof" of that intent.
(2) A secret subterranian chamber for bomb making was lo-
191
cated 40 meters below the reactor.
France, whose technicians were responsible for every
phase of the construction of the 70 megawatt reactor at Osirak,
192immediately repudiated this spy-novel charge as "fantastic." Mr.
Begin then retreated to a new position saying that the alleged
193inner sanctum was only four meters below the main structure. The
contrast between the original and the revised claim is the difference
between a deeply buried military bunker and the average depth of
a normal basement. The new depth description led most observers
to believe that Mr. Begin had apparently "confused" a space
utilized as a widely publicized spent-fuel-reprocessing area for
a clandestine Iraqi Manhatten Project headquarters. Such "con-
fused" information hardly makes for convincing evidence of an
absolute necessity for violent anticipatory self-defense.
(3) Iraq refused to allow I.A.E.A. inspections.
This contention simply is not true. One inspection was
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cancelled at the immediate outset of the Iraqi-Iranian War,
but other than in that one instance of national-security con-
siderations, the I.A.E.A. has been unhindered in its periodic
inspections of Osirak, the most recent being in January 1981.
Another inspection was scheduled for mid-June, but by that time
194
the Israelis had destroyed the plant.
Such a contention is also somewhat incredible considering
the source, since Israel has never signed the NPT and never
allowed I.A.E.A. officials anywhere near its nuclear facility at
Dimona in the Negev Dessert. Dimona is not only beyond the
construction stage and fully functioning, outside the regime of
any international safeguards, but, given the recent disclosures
by former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Dimona may,
quite articulately, be described as an atomic-bomb producing
195
plant. For the pot to claim anticipatory self-defense based on
the blackness of the kettle is hypocritical, and even more so
when the facts reflect that even the pot's accusation is un-
founded.
(4) I.A.E.A. safeguards are inadequate for detection of non-
peaceful diversion of radioactive material.
This contention is also hypocritical, for any safeguards
are more adequate than no safeguards. In any event, not only did
196the I.A.E.A. immediately contest the Israeli assertion, but
scientist after scientist has come forward to confirm that such




plish. During the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
the Israeli attack, only one witness, Mr. Roger Richter, seemed
convinced that an undetected diversion was probable. Mr. Richter,
who claimed to have resigned as an I.A.E.A. inspector so as to be
able to testify fully as to the shortcomings of the I.A.E.A. vis-
198
a-vis its inspection capabilities at Osirak, admitted under
questioning that he had never been to Osirak, and in fact had
199
never even been to Iraq.
Mr. Richter 's prepared testimony also took as a starting
point the fact that all of the I.A.E.A. inspectors thus far
having visited the reactor site have been either Soviets or from
Bloc countries, clearly implying an East-West issue ("keep in
mind that any adverse conclusions you (the Soviet inspector)
might reach as a result of your inspections would have to take
into account your country's sensitivity to how this information
,200
might affect relations with Iraq"). Under questioning, however,
he admitted that the Soviet record on non-proliferation has been
excellent
.
Even this key witness for the Israeli position did not
present a cogent case for the probability of success of any Iraqi
effort to surreptitiously extract weapons grade material without
detection. On page 12 of his prepared testimony he assumes that
the inspector must prepare himself "mentally to ignore the many
signs that may indicate the presence of clandestine activity . .
. . if there will be "many signs," then how can one maintain
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that the non-peaceful purpose would be undetected? If there will
203
be "many signs" in the event that these "clandestine activities"
should commence in the future, then where is the Israeli neces-
sity now, based only on untested hyphothesis, to resort to
highly intense self-help.
Concerning the element of the immediacy of that "necessity,"
it is interesting to note that Mr. Richter also tesified: "I
believe that the Iraqi nuclear program was organized for the pur-
pose of developing a capability to produce nuclear weapons, over
the next several years ." Thus even if Mr. Richter 's opinion con-
cerning the subjective intent of Iraq were correct, Israel had a
window of "serveral years" in which to seek peaceful termination
of the nuclear-capability development program. It thus becomes
ever clearer that Israel was not "forced" to take violent action
because of any immediacy; Israel was forced to use violence only
because any peaceful demarche would have further exposed the
double standard of Dimona305 Israel would quite reasonably be
asked to peacefully play by the same rulebook, and that "price"
206
was simply more than Israel was willing to pay.
One further quote from Mr. Richter would seem apposite here.
"We must all work together on this problem (of nuclear prolifera-
207
tion). There can be no more important task." Rather than working
together, Israel chose to operate alone, both at Dimona and
^ . 208Osirak. Israel sees its important task not to be nuclear non-
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proliferation, but nuclear superiority.
(5) Iraqi President Hussain made clear his intent to use the
reactor "against the Zionist enemy."
The much heralded quote from Al Thawra was clearly cited
by Israel to bolster two prongs of its overall argument: (1)
that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons, and (2)
that those bombs were unmistakably intended to be utilized against
Israel. It is clear that Israel wanted to show the world that ±t_
was to be the target, that it^ was the clear victim of the "threat"
and thus the appropriate state to respond, for Iraq has at least
two more immediate enemies, including its arch-rival Syria, and
its current opponent in war, Iran. Thus, in order to avoid the
appearance of paranoia, Israel utilized the quote as patent proof
of its contention.
Unfortunately for the Isareli position, it subsequently was
forced to admit that the quote did not exist l^jiven the initial
accusation as to the exact publication, the exact date, and the
exact words, it is incredible to believe that the claimant's
"error" was an error at all. One must assume that if Israeli
pilots can speak Arabic, then Israeli intelligence gatherers can
read Arabic adequately enough to check whether a Baghdad news-
paper quote exists or does not existr. Suffice it to say that the
facts concerning Osirak's being intended for non-peaceful pur-
poses are far less conclusive than the fact that Israel's "evi-
dence" was intended as propagand^r Bringing claims such as
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deeply buried secret chambers and fictional quotes before the
community-of-nations decision-making forum is not conclusive on
212
that forum; it is contempt of that forum.
(6) France and Italy compromised all principles of nuclear
safeguards in their lust for oil.
As has been noted earlier, Israel does not trust any
other nation, and frequently it substantiates that mistrust on
the basis of reducing the world's value system to a unidimen-
213
tional plane: the lust for fossil fuel. Any criticism, however
constructive, of Israeli actions consistently precipitates some
orchestration of the motif that the critic has sold out to the
214
oil interest. The approach is blatantly ad hominem, but in
conjunction with the constant invocation of the Nazi holocaust
and intimations of anti-semitism, the manuever has been rela-
tively successful in enabling Isreal to avoid any serious dis-
215
cussion of more difficult issues.
Aside from this diversionary aspect of the Israeli conten-
tion, the facts again do not substantiate the claim. During the
Senate hearings on Osirak, it was noted by a number of experts
that Iraq had made efforts to obtain a different type of nuclear
reactor, but that since that reactor type was too amenable to the
production of weapons-grade material, no one would sell it one.
It is difficult to perceive how that fact comports with any





Further, it should be noted that even the Giscard Government
had agreed to the Osirak project only on the condition that
French technicians remain at the facility until 1989, thus en-
suring a watchdog capability above and beyond the I.A.E.A. in-
217
spection cycle. That this agreement was not made public is of
little solace to the Israeli argument, for one must remember that
Israel claimed to know about secret chambers and other "reliable"
secret information about the plant. If its intelligence system
can claim the ability to detect fictional secrets upon which to
predicate a justification for an attack, it is not too much for
the world community to ask that it turn up a few factual ones
also.
Mr. Begin is also proud of his intelligence system at the
highest levels of the United States government, and thus, since
the Giscard technician provision was inserted in the Iraqi agree-
ment at the prompting of President Carter
,
it is less than credible
to assume that Israel knew nothing of the provisiolT'r It is more
consistent to assume that Israel knew, but again refused to con-
sider anything short of its self-help solution as adequate for
its perceived needs.
(7) United States intelligence had informed Israel that Iraq
was preparing a bomb soon.
This assertion served two Israeli purposes: (1) to
broaden the base of its otherwise unilateral claim, and (2) to
broaden the gap between the United States and the Arab world, as
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the assertion clearly (and, one may assume, not inadvertantly)
implies U.S. involvement in at least the preliminary activities
that finally led to the raid. The latter purpose is reprehen-
sible and again points out the monocular view of Israel as to its
"alliance" with the United States; U.S. political, economic, and
foreign policy interests were not only not considered, they were
220
attempted to be manipulated for Israel's parochial benefit.
As to the former purpose, i.e. , of broadening the base of
the claims, the assertion lost all value when, on the 16th of
June, Israel's chief of military intelligence confirmed that
no such information had been conveyed to Israel by the United
States. The assertion, after having done its U.S. /Arab damage,
was simply retractea.
(8) The reactor was to come on line as soon as early July.
This assertion was intended to bolster the immediacy of
the "threat" and thus the necessity for decisive action. Its
accuracy has been directly contested by French nuclear experts,
who stated that the plant was not scheduled to come on line
(become critical) until the end of the year, five to six months
222further away. Press accounts also report that Israeli intelli-
gence had informed the Israeli government of this added time
frame before the attack, but that information apparently changed
neither the decision to attack nor the formulation of the asser-
223
tion that subsequently was released for public consumption.
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Even if one accepted arguendo Israel's early July timeframe,
that would mean that Israel still had almost a month in which to
interact with the new French government and the fledgling Reagan
Administration concerning peaceful alternatives that might be
arranged. More importantly, it meant that Israel might have a
new government before the Osirak "critical" day was reached, as
the Israeli election day was scheduled for the end of June. Mr.
Begin was thus not only not willing to trust peaceful initiatives
with other nations, he was not even willing to trust the Israeli
224
electorate. The immediacy, or lack thereof, of the reactor
start-up date would thus not appear to have been the critical
factor in the decision to bomb, but the immediacy of the election
day and the effect that the spectacular raid might have on the
electorate. Opposition candidates were thus trapped, either
having to support the extremely successful operation, and thus
the Prime Minister who conceived it, or to raise honest questions
as to its legitimacy and thus to suffer an unpatriotic image and
225
Mr. Begin 's cries of "sabotage."
Even if one were to assume that Mr. Begin intended no such
domestic political advantage from the attack, the political
implications are there, and that is one of the multitude of
factors that distinguishes the raid on Osirak from the Cuban
Missile Crisis. President Kennedy had bipartisan domestic and
unanimous hemispheric support for his actions, and that is a
major benefit of collective defensive action: not only does it

- 87 -
increase the likelihood that the defensive action ultimately
chosen will have been objectively evaluated and the threat ob-
jectively perceived, but it serves to remove even the aura of
self-serving intentions and ulterior motives.
During the Senate hearings, one witness for the Israeli
position attempted to show that the Iraqi president was committed
to nuclear destruction of Israel since he needed an external
226
enemy to divert attention from his domestic shortcomings. This
argument is sadly ironic, for the sudden upsurge of bellicosity
of Mr. Begin during the days before the Israeli election, with
227
renewed incursions into Lebanon, a new crisis with Syria, and a
new "defensive" initiative at Osirak, served him well in avoiding
the homefront issues of 130 percent inflation, increased emigration
by the educated class, and other unpopular reflections on the
228
Begin government. The pot once more is only enlightened as to
229
the blackness of the kettle.
(9) The timing of the bombing was humanitarian, for once the
reactor was "hot," any bombing would irradiate Baghdad.
On a strictly emotional plane, the contention concerning
humanitarian considerations for the citizens of Baghdad comports
somewhat awkwardly with the Begin quote: "I don't care about the
230
Arab world. I care about our lives." Even if one were to con-
cede Mr. Begin 's humanitarian concern, however, the factual plane
again runs contra to the contention. Expert testimony during the
Senate hearings and a new Congressional Research publication
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confirm that if the plant had been bombed in the same manner
after the reactor had come on line, irradiation would have ex-
231
tended "perhaps a 1000 yards. "^ Baghdad is 12 miles away from
Osirak.
Either the humanitarian consideration was mistaken, in which
case Israeli intelligence gathering is once again found wanting,
or the humanitarian argument was another orchestration of Israel
232
trying to convince itself.
(10) The attack took place on Sunday, to ensure that French
technicians would not be injured.
This humanitarian contention would seem to contradict
the preceding humanitarian contention, for if one is so concerned
with the Iraqi citizens in Baghdad, why is one only concerned
with the French technicians at the reactor site.
That question aside, the facts again disprove the conten-
tion. Contrary to Israeli intelligence reports that those workers
would be off on Sunday, the French technicians took their days
233
off on Friday, the Moslem day of rest. The point seems minor
(except to the French technician who died in the attack), but
when aggregated with all the other Israeli "intelligence" short-
falls mentioned in preceeding headings, it shows that, although
the Israeli airforce is exceptionally skilled, the information





en) All diplomatic avenues had been exhausted.
This contention was discussed thoroughly supra. Given
the five to six months that the Israeli Government had even
before the plant was to be operable, and the several years that
even Mr. Richter admitted would be needed before the Iraqis would
possess even the capability for producing nuclear weapons, the
striking down of Osirak only two weeks after France had elected a
President sympathetic to Israel and unsympathetic to prolifera-
tion can hardly be called the exhaustion of diplomatic avenues.
Israel trusts no nation, however friendly, but somehow it trusts
235its intelligence gathering system, however unintelligent.
(12) A "technical state of war" with Iraq justified the
action.
It is true that, since Israel and Iraq have no common
border, no armistice agreement was signed by those nations at the
conclusion of the first Arab/ Israeli war (1947-1949). Three
points need be made however.
(a) Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which
preserves and expands the spirit of the Pact of Paris concerning
the renunciation of the use of force as a national instrument of
236
policy, provides as follows:
All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations .237
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The article says nothing about war, and certainly nothing
238
about a technical state of war. Unless the force is allowed for
under some other provision of the Charter, and thus consistent
with it, the force or threat of force violates the Article. The
assertion of a technical state of war thus adds nothing to the
Israeli argument, for it must still go to Article 51 (self-
defense) in order to make its argument/claim concerning the
justified exception to the general rule, and once it gets there,
it is again confronted with the requirement of showing that
necessity and proportionality existed.
(b) The very fact that Israel claimed the bombing of
Osirak to be "supreme, legitimate self-defense" implies that
Israel is aware that a state of war does not justify all acts of
force that a nation at war may choose to take. To claim that it
did would compel the conclusion that the aggressor '
s
acts of
force are justified, if it only remembers to declare war first.
That is clearly why Israel was careful to claim self-defense, for
defensive acts of force are justified in the face of aggression
(whether during war, or any other scenario of illegal coercion).
Thus, once again the fact of a technical state of war adds nothing
to the formula, for the formula only pivots on the presence of
the elements of self-defense; necessity and proportionality.
(c) Aside from these legal points, a more visceral
point might also be made. If a nation is truly committed to
peace in a region of the world, and if it discovers that more
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than three decades ago it concluded no armistice with another
state with whom it had been at war, would that peaceful nation
presume a technical state of war and take action to renew it, or
would it presume a prescriptive state of peace and take steps to
formalize and preserve it? The question is only hypothetical;
the history of the Middle East is extremely complex. But the
Palestinian question is not hypothetical, and as long as Israel
is unwilling to address it directly and settle it justly, Israel
will have no need to dust off "technical states of war," for it
can expect a profusion of new wars until the issue of self-
239
determination is finally resolvea.
In the words of Nahum Goldmann, former president of the World
Zionist Organization and founder of the World Jewish Congress:
It is an irony of fate that now that the Arabs have
expressed a willingness to discuss peace under certain condi-
tions, the dominant tendency in Israel lacks the necessary
flexibility to take advantage of this new situation.
As a result, Israel is increasingly isolated politi-
cally and faces a growing danger of losing the support of
world public opinion. The greatest threat to Israel today
if not Arab arms and the lack of financial means but the
slow erosion of world sympathy, particularly among the pro-
gressive nations that have always supported Israel.^'-'
(13) Iraq refuses to recognize Israel.
This statement is also true, as a basic expression of
241
the Iraqi position. But Israel's demand to be recognized raises
additional questions. Which Israel should Iraq recognize? The
Israel the United Nations created in the Partition Resolution of
1947? The expanded Israel of 1949? The Israel which claims
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"Judea and Samaria," and speaks only of distant autonomy, but
never sovereignty, on the occupied West Bankr^The Israel which
243L
claims all of Jerusalem in fee simple absolute? The Israel in
the Golan Heights, in the Gaza, in the Sinai? The Israel of
Haddadland and whatever airspace it chooses in the rest of
Lebanon?''^The universal Israel of The Jewish People? Dr finally
in the instance of Osirak, the Israel with the claims to over-
flight rights in Saudi Arabia and Jordan?
Recognition implies boundary definition and finite limits to
sovereignty/^ The Israelis, not the Iraqis, seem most uncertain
about these concepts.
To speak momentarily in parables, let one assume that
tomorrow Iraq were to state that it would recognize the Israel of
the Partition Resolution of 1947. Israel would surely respond:
"That is ancient history. Many wars have brought new changes.
Circumstances and realities are now different." To that Iraq
might quietly reply: "But no my friend. Just yesterday we heard
it proclaimed that a technical state of war continues from the
first great conflict, and if that first war is still with us,
then surely the issues that that war presented are still un-
247
settled. The interim has changed nothing."
The moral of the parable is this — when one makes a multi-
tude of claims, one must take care that they are consistent.
(14) President Kennedy would subscribe to the Israeli
position, for he saw that danger can be "imminent," even though
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the trigger has not been pulled.
To extract a quote from the context of the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis to support the definition of "imminent danger" as
perceived by the Israelis in the context of Osirak is to invite a
comparison of the two fact situations to see if the contexts
truly align. A side-by-side comparison of the salient conditions
in each is provided below.
Cuban Missile Crisis
(1) Nuclear weapons were present
and in place
(2) Evidence of the nuclear
weapons' sites photographic
and conclusive
(3) The evidence was expedi-
tiously published for world
consideration before any de-
structive damage inflicted
(in fact no destructive damage
was ever inflicted)
(4) The security interest in-
volved was hemispheric and
the actions implemented had
hemispheric approval
(5) Defensive action imple-
mented was low in in-
tensity and totally non-
invasive
Osirak Reactor Question
(1) No nuclear weapons present;
nuclear reactor that might
make the materials neces-
sary for nuclear weapons
was not even completed
(2) Evidence that plant might
somehow secretly produce
weapons grade material con-
jectural and based on numer-
ous retracted or discredited
contentions
(3) Contentions published "post-








(6) Higher level of coercive (6) Intense response elected
intensity was reserved as first resort
as a last resort
(7) United Nations was involved (7) United Nations ignored
to play a positive role
In short, to compare the trigger-that-had-not-yet-been-pulled
scenario of the Cuban Missile Cirsis to Osirak is an exercise in
futility. The United States was looking down the barrel; Iraq
had not even completed the factory that might someday produce
the gui??°
(15) The reactor posed a mortal threat to Israel's very survival
This is not a justification, it is a conclusion drawn
from all the other contentions — contentions, one must add, that,
when evaluated objectively, do not add up to the conclusion.
(16) The playing of the Holocaust card.
When all else fails, Mr. Begin is quick to "play the
Holocaust card." It seems to make little difference that the Nazis
fled to South America and not to Iraq. Iraq, and the whole world,
must share the guilt and the responsibility for the atrocities of
Auschwitz. To Mr. Begin, it is as clear as the catechismal credo
of original sin; all must not only recall and regret it, they
must continue to repay The Jewish People for the debt of suffering
that can never be fully repaid. If one refuses to be shamed for




The Holocaust card is an insult, not just to the world, but to
the integrity of the citizens of Israel. Why then is it played
so often? Because it continues to work — at least in the United
States, which is especially ironic considering that it was that
same United States that was a driving force in bringing Nazi
252Germany to its knees. As long as this principle of guiltless
guilt continues to work on the United States, however, Mr. Begin
is assured the money and munitions that allow freedom of action
and freedom from responsibility. Why should Israel care as to
the thinness of its "defensive" claim concerning Osirak or as to
the unanimous condemnation by the Security Council that ensuea,
so long as the Holocaust card works again on the United States
and it renews the shipment of F16's and continues the FY82 com-
mitment of 2.2 billion dollars in aid to Israelr
If the United States cannot see the respondent superior
analogy because it is surely not the master of Israel, then
perhaps one might suggest to the United States a more apposite
analogy, like the Dram Shop legislation of its several states.
When the bartender negligently supplies the customer too much, so
that the customer loses control, then the bartender must bear the
responsibility for the damage that is done.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Although Israel and the Soviet Union are at opposite ends of
the ideological spectrum, the application of a non-ideological.
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multi-factor analytical methodology to the evaluation of their
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan leads to a similar decision-
making conclusion: their actions cannot be justified under
international standards of anticipatory self-defense, for neither
instance evidences either adequate necessity or proportionality
of response.
In spite of their disparate ideologies, both claimants share
similar perceptions of their uniqueness and the uniqueness of
their security needs. Both the Bridgehead and the Begin Doc-
trines require preventive action, both coercive and invasive,
whenever even the potential of possibly threatening activity is
255
present. Both nations have acquired occupied territories for
further insulation, only to perceive each expansion as preci-
pitating a need for even more "defense." Each step taken to
satisfy the demands of security only increases their^sense of
insecurity. Both perceive themselves to be encircled and alone,
forced by external hostility to extraordinary measures of self-
defense, and even though the foreign territories that they occupy
do not alleviate insecurity, neither is able to trust any good
offices which might suggest that surrender of those territories
might lead to greater security for all. Both perceive unilateral
force to be an indication of continued strength.
Both nations also reject the reciprocity that is implicit in
recognition, as each demands that its sovereignty be respected

- 97 -
and recognized, but each reserves the right, due to its unique
security needs, to interfere with or deny the sovereignty of
others. Sovereignty shields Dimona from any international ini-
tiatives, but sovereignty has no applicability to Osirak. Sov-
ereignty now demands the recognition of Karmal in Afghanistan,
but sovereingty was not an issue in the initial invasion and
overthrow of Amin.
Whether it is the claim to be the vanguard and protector of
the chosen socialist path, or the claim to be the undoer of the
Diaspora and the defender of The chosen Jewish People, each such
claim is demanding of the international community something it
cannot afford to give — an international affirmative-action
256
program for one nation's benefit. International law cannot place
an imprimatur of preference on the Soviet ideology of socialism,
any more than it can allow Israel an exemption from the law of
nations due to the Holocaust and the "injustice" which once
befell the borders of King David. Once international law fosters
preference, it forfeits universality, and the latter is the
linchpin of any legal system. Without it, the force of law is
lost to the demands of the law of force.
Even though the United Nations has seemingly lost the decisional
will to exercise the enforcement sanctions available to it (due
to Permanent-Member vetos and the unwillingness of states to
suffer the domestic economic strains that trade sanctions impose
on the sanctioner), it is a positive sign that that forum has
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proven able, in its decision-making capacity, to functionally,
vice ideologically, analayze actions of its member states, and to
strongly condemn those actions when they run contrary to the
basic purposes and principles of the Charter.
The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan has twice been
condemned by the General Assembly, and further resolutions of
condemnation should continue, both as a reaffirmation of the il-
legality of the act and as a sanction wh'ich carries with it
increasing political cost to the Soviets and thus increasing
incentive for the Soviets to seek an internationally acceptable
solution.
Israel has also righfully received the unanimous condemna-
tion of the Security Council, and the General Assembly should
take immediate steps to reinforce this Security Council action
with its own resolutions of condemnation, when it reconvenes in
September.
The United States, however, is the only nation which can
effectively influence the attitude and actions of Israel, and it
is in America's self-interest to do so. Israel's present posture
compromises United States' interests in at least four long reaching
ways: (1) economically, with the wedge that it drives between
the mutual trade interests of the Arab states and the West, (2)
strategically, with the loss of critical influence in the Levant
257
and the Persian Gult, (3) morally, with the loss of image as a
force of peace and justice (an image that Americans truly cherish).
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and (4) legally, as it establishes precedents that the United
States cannot condone now but attempt to condemn later when
258
others act in kind.
Some circles might argue that America is economically strong
enough to survive without the Middle East, strategically secure
enough to forego that region's support, and that morality calls
for recollection of the Holocaust, not reflection of current
denials of the right to self-determination. However myopic these
arguments might be, their acceptance would not dispel the pivotal
implications of the fourth factor, legal precedent. The United
States cannot continue to provide "blank check" support to the
259
claimant without binding itself to the claim. Even United States
domestic legislation requires that the support to Israel be only
for "defensive" purposes, and by its conduct (which speaks to the
260
world much louder than its careful condemnation of the Osirak raid)
of continuing that support after each Israeli "defensive" claim,
it is unmistakably evidencing a concurrence, or at least a toler-
261
ance, of that claim. Other states will take notice, and when
they too take recourse to similar exercises of "supreme, legiti-
mate self-defense," the hands of the United States will be tied
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definition of imperialist/colonialist is ofttimes expanded to
include those competitors who fail to recognize the world van-
guard position of the CPSU. Therefore the Peoples Republic of
China, although socialist, is frequently labelled as imperialist
and neocolonialist by the USSR. As to a recent expression of the
Soviet socialists' perception of the Chinese socialists as
"hegemonists" and "agents" of the American imperialists, see
N.Y. Times
,
June 18, 1981, A3.
91. CRS Report
,
supra note 1, at 85-86.
92. Id_^ at 85.
93. 21^ 3-^ 85-86.
94. In the words of the front page headlines of the Kabul New
Times (English edition) of January 1, 1980: "Sanguinary Amin
band ousted. . .murderer meets his fate."
95. CRS Report
,
supra note 1, at 86.
96. Id. at 106. On November 20, 1980, the General Assembly
voted 111 to 22 to again demand the immediate withdrawal of "foreign
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troops" from Afghanistan (with 7 more African nations joining
in the majority vote.) Before the vote was taken, the Soviet
Ambassador rose to denounce the resolution as an "inadmissible
interference" in the affairs of Afghanistan ( .' ) . In reply to
previous Soviet assertions that the vote would be an 'Unfriendly
act", U.S. Ambassador McHenry pointed out in his speech to the
Assembly: "The real unfriendly act was the invasion of Afghan-
istan." Id. at 108. See also N.Y. Times , Nov. 21, 1980, Al.
97. Neither superpower seems trustful of independent neutrals, as
the position of being neutral does not comport with the super-
powers' perception of the East-West orientation of the world
political order. Both superpowers, however, will have to at some
point realize that nonalignment does not equate to realignment,
for the Third World in general trusts neither superpower and
perceives the world political plane not as East-West, but as
North-South. As to the Reagan administration's difficulties in
trying to convince the world of its East-West analysis of all
issues, see the reports concerning the allies' rejection of
the U.S. version of the so-called Caribbean Basin Plan, which
was hoped by the White House to assist in the economic isolation
of Cuba and other leftist governments in the West Indies. Wash.
Post
,
July 12, 1981, A24; Wash. Post
,
June 27, 1981, All; Wash.
Post. June 23, 1981, A9.
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98. CRS Report , supra note 1, at 107. The 92 members of the
Movement of Nonaligned Nations have also called for withdrawal
of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan. Wash. Post , Feb. 14, 1981,
Al.
99. CRS Report , supra note 1, at 87.
100. Id_^ at 88.
101. Concerning the political cornerstone of the Soviets' anxiety
—that the Afghani socialist regime might be replaced by a more
Western model—reference might once again be made to U.N.G.A.
Resolution 2625 ( see note 32 supra ) , which specifically states in
article 5 that "no consideration of whatever nature, whether
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justifi-
cation for aggression." It might also be noted that Afghanistan
and the Soviet Union entered into a "Convention for the Definition
of Aggression," one of the so-called Litvinov Conventions, in
1933. 136 B.F.S.P. 545; 147 L.N.T.S. 69 (July 3, 1933). Article
III of this Convention declared that no act of aggression can be
justified on the instability of the "internal conditions" of a
signatory state, whether such instability is due to "its political,
economic, or social structure; alledged defects in its administra-
tion, (or) disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-
revolutions or civil war." This underlying political invalidity
of the Bridgehead theory compromises not only the Soviets' position
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on the Afghanistan question, but also raises questions con-
cerning at least one justification proffered by the United
States for its "police action" in the Dominican Republic in
1965. On May 2, 1965, President Johnson, in a radio broadcast
to the American public, stated: "The American nations cannot,
must not and will not permit the establishment of another
Communist government in the Western Hemisphere." Reprinted in
Donelan & Grieve, Int ' 1 Disputes: Case Histories 1945-1970 , at
256 (1973). Granted that the Dominican Republic incident involved
collective action and U.N. participation in the supervision of
subsequent elections and had additional bases of justification,
but if the core justification was that of the quoted policy
position of President Johnson, then it is functionally a Bridgehead
contention deserving of no better or no worse legal appraisal than
the Bridgehead argument of the Soviets.
102. CRS Report
,
supra note 1, at 87.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Recent reports do indicate that clandestine supply lines
to the Mujahaddin have now been established by the West, but only




July 22, 1981, A9.
105. Wash. Post
,
Aug. 12, 1980, Al . The Mujahaddin also use the
not-so-modern British Lee-Enfield rifle, which makes up for its
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age in sharpshoot ing accuracy. Id .
106. See N.Y. Times , Sept. 11, 1980, A6 (reporting major defections
and also noting that Kabul's newspapers were being staffed with Soviet
editors); Bait. Sun
,
Sept. 9, 1980, A2; See also Wash. Post , July 23,
1981, A22 (noting the use in combat of only partially-trained highschool
military cadets by the Karmal Regime as a further indication of the
drastic depletion of regular Afghani forces); Phil. Inquirer
,
Sept.
30, 1980, A12 (reporting that the Soviets have had to resort to the
hiring of "militiamen" from Afghan tribes at more than 10 times the
salary of a regular army soldier). As to the capture of Soviet weapons,
cf . reports concerning the war material used by the UNITA forces of
Jonas Savimbi in the on-going civil war against the Soviet and Cuban
supported government of Angola. Wash. Post
,
July 20, 1981, Al
.
107. Wall St. J.
,
Aug. 29, 1980, Al.
108. Wash. Post
,
Apr. 2, 1981, A15; See also. Wall St. J. , Aug. 29,




Aug. 12, 1980, Al
.
110. This is true certainly as to the claim of anticipatory self-
defense under the Bridgehead theory. As to the current supply support
of the West to the mujahaddin ( see note 104, supra ) , this external
support could rightfully be required to cease simultaneously with the
total withdrawal of the Soviet presence-
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111. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt is reported to have
been told by top Kremlin officials that withdrawal from Afghanistan
required "assurances of Soviet border security," thus highlighting
the exclusivity of the interests being protected. Any settlement
acceptable to the Soviets, Brandt was told, would have to bar "all
intervention from Iranian and Pakistani territory," which is notable
due to the conspicuous lack of any mention of interference from Soviet
territory. Wash. Post , July 2, 1981, A28.
112. South Asia analyst Selig Harrison has qoaoted a Soviet source as
confirming that the "Sovietization" of Afghanistan has the objective
of molding the latter into another Mongolia — a previously indepen-
dent country that is completely under Soviet domination, although
it maintains its U.N. status as a voting member/nation. Wash. Post
,
Feb. 27, 1981, A20.
113. Joining in the second U.N.G.A. resolution calling for "immediate
withdrawal of foreign troops" from Afghanistan were Albania, the
Peoples' Republic of China, and Yugoslavia. N.Y. Times
,
Nov. 21, 1980,
Al. Romania has also called for withdrawal. Phil. Inquirer
,
Nov. 6,
1980, A13; Wash. Post
,
Nov. 27, 1980, A31. Europe's largest nonruling
communist party, the Italian Communist Party under Enrico Berlinguer,
was even barred from delivering an address to the Soviet Communist
Party Congress, due to its criticism of the Soviet presence in Afghan-
istan. Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1981, A21.
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114. Mallison, supra , note 9, at 357.
115. Concerning the "Great Game" of empire between Russia and Britain
in the 1800 's over Afghanistan, see Rubinstein, "Soviet Imperialism
in Afghanistan," Current Hist. 80 (Oct. 1980); Smith, supra note 22,
at 653; Chi. Tribune , Nov. 16, 1980, A3.
116. CRS Report , supra note 1, at 87.
117. Id. , at 86
118. An Islamic Conference summit meeting of 38 Moslem leaders has
declared its full solidarity with the "holy war" of the Afghani
mujahaddin guerrillas. Wash. Post
,
Feb. 1, 1981, A20.
119. Wash. Post
,
July 29, 1980, Al ; Bait. Sun , Aug. 2, 1980, Al
.
Even an occasional glimpse of Soviet unwelcomeness is now to be seen
within the Karmal government itself . Reports from New Delhi in April,
1981, noted that Karmal ' s chief economic advisor had resigned to pro-
test the continued Soviet occupation. Wash. Post
,
Apr. 24, 1981, Mil.
Khalq leaders have reportedly also demanded the withdrawal of the
Soviet troops, and there has recently been a reported "shootout" within
the walls of the People's Palace in Kabul between Khalq and Parcham
(Karmal 's minority party) factions. Wash. Post
,
June 12, 1981, A24.
120. CRS Report
,
supra note 1, at 44; Bennigsen, "Soviet Muslims and
thw World of Islam," Prob. of Communism (Mar. - Apr. 1980), 38, at 40.
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121. It also serves to detract from Soviet confidence, for the Soviet
army in Afghanistan, although superior in manpower and firepower, has
proven unable to suppress the indigenous forces of the fiercely inde-
pendent mujahaddin. To quote one guerrilla: "Everything is on the
side of the invader — except the Afghani people." Bait. Sun
,
July
22, 1980, A2. For an analysis of the first year of the Soviets'
occupation, see Khalilzad, "Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan," Problems of
Communism (Nov. - Dec. 1980), 23. Morale within the mujahaddin groups
is said to be higher now (June 1981) than at any point since the
Soviet occupation began. Wash. Post
,
June 5, 1981, Al
.
122. See note 96, supra .
123. See Wash. Post
,
July 7, 1981, A12 (concerning the two-tiered
proposal of the European Common Market, wherein initial negotiations
between states other than Afghanistan would lay the groundwork for
guarantees of nonintervention by those states in the internal affairs
of a neutralized Afghani state, only then to be followed by negotia-
tions between all parties concerned, including the various factions
of the Afghani civil conflict, to determine just which government
of Afghanistan should be recognized to head that neutralized state);
see also Wash. Post
,
June 25, 1981, A24 . U.N. Secretary General Wald-
heim has also appointed a special representative to achieve a negoti-
ated settlement in Afghanistan, but again progress is blocked by pro-





July 7, 1981, A12. As to the after-the-fact claim
of "internal affairs/' one should consider also the presence of the
200,000 Vietnamese troops currently (for the past 2-1/2 years) in
Cambodia at the "request" of the Vietnamese-installed regime. In
response to the latest U.N. attempt to accomplish a negotiated with-
drawal of those foreign troops, Radio Hanoi has chastised the U.N.-
sponsored conference as "a gross interference in Cambodia's internal
affairs." Wash. Post
,
July 18, 1981, A22. Vietnam and the Soviet
Bloc maintain that the Cambodian situation is "irreversible." N.Y.
Times
,
June 19, 1981, A5.
125. A hijacked Pakistani airliner remained on the ground at Kabul
for seven days in March, with accusations of open cooperation by the
authorities there with the hijackers. A number of diplomats stated
that the Karmal regime (and the Soviets) apparently thought the situ-
ation could be manipulated to force Pakistan to recognize it as the
lawful government of Afghanistan. Wash. Post
,




Mar. 16, 1981, A8.
126. CRS Report
,




June 10, 1981, Al
.
128. Id.
129. See 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (1976). As to the repurcussions of a "sub-




130. Wash. Post , June 10, 1981, Al ("apparently bypassing Jordan").
But cf. Wash. Post , June 12, 1981, Al (escaped after attack through
Jordanian airspace).
131. Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 12, 1981, 10.
132. Wash. Post
,
June 10, 1981, Al.
133. Id.
134. Christian Sci. Monitor , June 9, 1981, 1.
135. See Wash. Post , June 12, 1981, Al.
136. Wash. Post , June 9, 1981, Al.
137. As a minor first example of a startling list of major Israeli
information and intelligence "mistakes," it quickly emerged that there
had been no such Jordanian announcement. Al-Hamishmar
,
June 12, 1981,
reprinted in Israeli Mirror
,
June 18, 1981, 3.
138. Wash. Post
,
June 10, 1981, Al.
139. Wash. Post
,
June 9, 1981, Al
.
140. Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 15, 1981, 1; Wash. Post , June 12,
1981, Al.





June 23, 1981, A13.
143. N.Y. Times
,
June 19, 1981, All; Christian Sci. Monitor , June 15,
1981, 1; Wash. Post , June 15, 1981, A16.
144. Wash. Post
,




June 17, 1981, A22.
146. Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 9, 1981, 1.
147. N.Y. Times
,
June 19, 1981, All; Christian Sci. Monitor , June 9,
1981, 1.
148. Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 10, 1981, 13; Wash. Post , June 10,
1981, Al.
149. Wash. Post , June 12, 1981, Al.
150. See B. Martin, testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, June 25, 1981, Hearings on the Aerial Attack of
Osirak
,
prepared comments, 6-7. (The Senate Report of those Hearings
is not yet published. Citations to those Hearings will be made to
witnesses' prepared comments, if printed and available. The Hearings
are hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Osirak .); Wash. Post
,
June 13, 1981, Al
.
151. Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
B. Martin, prepared comments, p. 6-7.
(June 25, 1981); Christian Sci. Monitor , June 12, 1981, 3.




153. Wash. Post , June 9, 1981, Al.
154. Wash. Post , June 10, 1981, Al.
155. Wash. Post
,
June 12, 198; , Al.
156. Wash. Post
,
June 10, 1981, Al.
157. The author is aware of no such invocation.
158. See note 41, supra.





3237 (XXIX), "Observer Status for the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion" (1974) (adopted by a vote of 95 to 17 (U.S.), with 19 absten-
tions); reprinted at 71 Dep't State Bull . 859 (Dec. 16, 1974).
160. South-west African People's Organization. The Republic of
South Africa also frequently invokes the right to self-defense in
"defending" occupied Namibia, which requires South Africa to strike
almost daily into Angola in search for SWAPO contingents. Wash. Post
,
June 8, 1981, Al ; Wash. Post , Mar. 19, 1981, A25.
161. See Wash. Post
,
Mar. 3, 1981, AlO.
162. Iraq is also involved currently in a "second war," given the
Kurdish insurgent movement in Northeast Iraq which has escalated
since the Islamic revolutionaries took power in Iran. Wash. Post
,
Feb. 10, 1981, A12.
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163. U.N. Doc A/Res/2373 (XXII); reprinted in Bishop, supra note 63,
at 289-91.
164. See note 130, supra ,
165. Concerning basic principles of vicarious responsibility of states,
see I. Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 6, at 321-69. U.S. Repre-
sentative Paul Findley (R-Ill.) has spoken to the issue of U.S. re-
sponsibility for Israel's actions. Besides recommending that Mr.
Begin 's expansive concept of "defense" under U.S. arms legislation could
easily be truncated by imposing new restrictions as to the use of U.S.
weapons beyond the recipient's borders (which would drain much of the
interpretive flexibility out of current arms-export legislation, but
which leads to the underlying question of just where Israel's "bor-
ders" are), the Republican Congressman points out that President Carter's
threat in 1979 to reduce aid to Israel if attacks against Lebanon con-
tinued brought those attacks to an end for a full year. Wash. Post
,
July 19, 1981, C6. This tends to confirm that Israel's courage is
directly proportional, not to "necessity" but to U.S. indulgence and
support. Its concept of "necessity" seems to expand to ensure full
utilization of whatever support is provided.
166. Israel's definition of "self-defense" continues to expand, as the
July 17, 1981, Israeli aerial attack on Beirut, which entailed sub-
stantial loss of civilian lives, has also been defended by Israeli
Ambassador to the U.N. , Yehuda Blum, as an act of "self-defense."
Wash. Post, July 18, 1981, A14.
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167. The example of the 1968 raid, wherein an Israeli commando de-
stroyed a number of unoccupied Arab commercial airplares, is presented
here only as an Israeli precedent; no judgment is made here as to the
legality of the raid itself under international law. Compare Falk,
"The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation," 63 A. J . I . L.
415 (1969) (finding the raid illegal), with Blum, supra note 3 (finding
the raid legal).
168. See Blum, supra note 3, at 76-79. A more recent example of
Israeli theories of respondent superior is reflected in the July 17,
1981, aerial bombing of densely populated neighborhoods in Beirut. It
is one thing to attempt to "pressure" a foreign government by sabotaging
an empty civilian airplane; it is another to massacre innocent human
beings. Maj . Gen. Yehoshua Saguy, head of Israeli Army Intelligence,
' has specifically stated that the 1981 Beirut raid "was to attempt to
generate Lebanese civilian resentment against the presence of Pale-
stinian guerrillas there." Wash. Post
,
July 20, 1981, Al . Not only
does this statement ignore history, which has shown such irresponsible
acts to increase
,
not decrease, resistance against the perpetrator,
but it also completely ignores article 33 of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Aug.
12, 1949 (1956), 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. 3365), which specifically
states: "Collective penalties and likewise all measure of intimida-
tion or of terrorism are prohibited." Protection of innocent civilians
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is not based on reciprocity, but the international mutuality of
respect for human decency, and thus for Israel to justify its illegal
governmental actions on the basis of sporadic terrorist activity is
for Israel to forfeit its claim as a government and to embrace the
status of being nothing but a terrorist itself. Mr. Begin, who is also
Israel's Defense Minister, has also stated that if the lives of Lebanese
civilians are endangered by Israeli attacks the responsibility rests
with the PLO. Wash. Post
,
July 18, 1981, Al. This can only indicate
once again that under Israeli international law, the taking of inno-
cent foreign lives is considered a justified method of exerting "pres-
sure" on guerrilla activities. Israel's employment of principles of
respondent superior against Lebanon is tragic, since Lebanon is vir-
i
tually helpless to take effective action, especially while the com-
plainant Israel is perpetuating that helplessness by its continued
I
' support of the destablizing forces of Maj . Haddad and factions of the
militant Phalangists, and by its continued bombing of Lebanese roads,
bridges, and other lines of economy and communication. Concerning
the defenselessness of Lebanon, see Wash. Post
,
July 22, 1981, A23.
169. It might be noted that Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya has justi-
fied his country's intervention in neighboring Chad in the following
words: "When we fight alongside the people of Chad, we are in fact
fighting in self-defense
,
because if France had won, then the Americans,
I the Israelis and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat would have also won."
Wash. Post
, Mar. 6, 1981, A19 (emphasis added). The point here is
not to defend the use of 35,000 Soviet-equipped Libyan troops and
Soviet-built jet bombers to annex part of Chad and intervene in the
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internal affairs of the remainder thereof; it is simply to note the
inconsistency of the U.S. government's indignation as to such "sur-
rogate" adventurism under a guise of self-defense, when the U.S. is
simultaneously supporting Israel in its 14-year occupation of foreign
territory and its innumerable bombing sorties outside its borders, all
under a similar interpretation of "self-defense." If the United States
allows Israel's actions to continue, then the precedents of both super-
powers and their "surrogates" will soon eliminate aggression fromtiie
international scene, not in the sense that aggression will factually
c^ase, but in the sense that all denotative value of the word agges-
sion will be subsumed in a new international formulation of "self-





June 9, 1981, Al.
|:
; 171. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 16, 1981, 6.
i
172. Concerning Israel's routine violations of Saudi airspace,
particularly in the area of the Saudi 's military base at Tobuk,
see Wash. Post
,
July 24, 1981, A13. Concerning the standard of neces-
sity required for a "defending" state to violate neutral territory,
see Bender, supra note 13, at 143 ("If the territory involved is that
of a neutral, the community interest in restricting the area of
I








supra note 1, at 212.
174. See note 156 supra (emphasis added).
175. As noted by Mr. Carl Degler, Professor of American History at
Stanford University, the discussions in the White House in the fall
of 1962 did include a suggestion that the United States should launch
a preemptive "surgical strike" on the Cuban missile sites. The idea
was rejected from the outset, however, as Attorney General Kennedy
argued convincingly against it, pointing out that it would be doing
to Cuba what the Japanese had done to the United States at Pearl Har-
bor. A far more apposite historical analogy to Osirak, Professor
Degler continues,
is to be found in the refusal of an earlier Republican
President to support or accept an Israeli pre-emptive
strike in 1956 against an Arab state. The object of
that strike, of couse, was Egypt — today the only Arab
country with which Isael has diplomatic relations. Yet
in 1956 as today, the argument was that the only way to





June 25, 1981, A18.
176. Concerning the requisite standards for a legal exercise of anti-
cipatory self-defense, Professor W.T. Mallison testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee as follows: "Anticipatory
self-defense is regarded as a highly unusual and exceptional matter
which may only be employed when the evidence of a threat is compelling
and the necessity to act urgent." Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
W.T.
Mallison, prepared comments, 1 (June 25, 1981).
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177. Wash. Post , June 12, 1981, Al
.
178. Mitterand had vigorously protested the contract with Iraq when
he was in the opposition and it was anticipated that his first trip




179. See note 161, supra .
180. U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. , Jeane Kirkpatrick, has specifically
stated that "diplomatic means available to Israel had not been ex-
hausted." Wash. Post
,
June 20, 1981, Al . Undersecretary of State
Walter Stoessel, Jr., also testified before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee that Israel had not exhausted diplomatic options.
Wash. Post
,
June 19, 1981, A17.
181. The term "blank check" has been specifically used to refer to
U.S. -Israeli relations by former Undersecretary of State George W.
Ball. Wash. Post
,
June 15, 1981, All.
182. Israel has flatly stated that it has no intention of accepting
a U.N. Security Council call to allow international inspection of
Israeli nuclear installations. Wash. Post
,
June 21, 1981, A26.
183. See note 6, supra .
184. Concerning Israel's lack of trust in anyone or anything, see
Christian Sci. Monitor, June 11, 1981, 1.
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185. And its Maecenas, the United States' public.
186. As to proportionality in the most recent "defensive" iTiOres of
Israel into Lebanon (July 1981), including the aerial bombings of the
densely populated Fakehani section of Beirut, casualties have been
estimated at 250 deaths and 900 injuries of Lebanese and Palestinians,
in comparison to 4 Israeli deaths and 50 injuries — a variance in
excess of 20 to 1 (in excess of 60 to 1 if just deaths are considered),
Wash. Post
,
July 20, 1981, Al . Again one can only assume that pro-
portionality, in the eyes of the Israelis, factors in a discrimination
multiple to reflect the greater value of an Israeli human being in
comparison to somehow lesser human beings. One must further question
how this philosophy comports with the "humanitarian" concerns claimed
to have been involved in the timing of the bombing of Osirak. In the
words of columnist Richard Cohen, to respond to random PLO rocket fire
by using "the most complex airplanes known to man to bomb a city neigh-
borhood (in Beirut) is not even in the same ballpark .... This is
what happens when a sovereign state adopts the terrorist morality of
its enemies and when its leaders become captive of their own, awful
personal experiences." Concerning the responsibility of the United
States, Mr. Cohen quite appropriately concludes: "If you don't con-
done it for your enemies, you can't for your friends, either." Wash.
Post, July 19, 1981, Bl. William Raspberry also comments: "(Mr.
Begin 's) guiding principle seems to be two eyes for a tooth . . . . '
The crucial fact, for U.S. policy, is that Israel's terrorism is U.S.-
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supplied and U. S . -financed." Wash. Post , July 22, 1981, A21.




Spring 1981, 756, at 775, (wherein Mr. Feldman recommends
as part of the "security package" framework for Israel's withdrawal
from the West Bank, that "Israel should develop nuclear weapons in
a quantity and of a yield sufficient to demolish salient targets in
each of the Arab states (!)).
188. Pakistan may further feel personally prejudiced in its defen-
sive needs by the continued U.S. indulgence of Israel, for the shipment
of the F16 fighters that it has requested from the U.S. has now been
postponed for "a number of years" because of "commitments to other
countries . . . ." Wash. Post
,
July 18, 1981, A19.
189. As has been noted by President Zia Ul-haq of Pakistan, the Russian
invasion of Afghanistan has now made Pakistan "a front-line state."
Wash. Post
,
Mar. 15, 1981, D7. Even if the Soviets were to withdraw
from Afghanistan, they have in the interim apparently annexed to
themselves the Wakhan Corridor in the northeast section of that state,
which establishes a direct border contact between Pakistan and the
USSR. Chi. Tribune
,
Nov. 16, 1980, A3; Phil. Inquirer , Nov. 5, 1980,
A9.
190. In the words of Mr. Begin: "We destroyed an atomic bomb-




191. Wash. Post , June 17, 1981, A22.
192. Wash. Post , June 13, 1981, A18; Wash. Post , June 14, 1981, A34
.




June 10, 1981, A17; Wash. Post , June 15, 1981, Al.
The IAEA has said that the January inspection found no evidence of
any activities not in accordance with the NPT. Id .
195. See N.Y. Times
,
June 25, 1981, Al
.
196. The Director General of the IAEA has stated that it would have
been "practically impossible" for the Osirak reactor to produce
weapons-grade plutonium, adding that:
In such a transparent pool reactor as Osirak, the pre-
sence of undeclared fertile fuel elements (the natural




June 17, 1981, Al
.
197. Even Israeli scientists have discounted the possibility of un-
detected diversion of plutonium by Iraq. Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 11, 1981, 1. The reactor issue was also examined by a French
committee headed by a known friend of Israel, Nobel Prize physicist
Alfred Koestler. The committee concluded that the Israeli concern
was unfounded. Halaretz
,
June 12, 1981; reprinted in Israeli Mirror
,
Jmne 18, 1981, 1. Nuclear specialists note that no signer of the
treaty banning the spread of weapons has ever abrogated safeguards.
Most of the nations that appear to be developing weapons have refused
to sign. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1981, All. Concerning the improbability
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of diversion without detection, see also the statements of Dr.
Herbert Kouts, chairman of the department of nuclear energy at Brook-
haven National Laboratory in New York, and Dr. Robert Seldon of the
Los Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico. Wash. Post
,
June 20, 1981, A16;
and the statement of Charles Van Doren, former assistant director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Wash. Post
,
June 30,
1981, Al (a study he made of the Iraqi nuclear program "uncovered no
evidence of actual Iraqi efforts to develop or manufacture a nuclear
explosive device"). The same Washington Post article cites a Con-
gressional Research Study report which concludes that even if Iraq
withdrew from the IAEA (since "quick detection" of any clandestine
weapons-development project could be expected if IAEA oversight con-
tinued) and embarked on a full bomb-oriented program, the amount of
weapons-grade plutonium that could likely be produced by the reactor
"probably would not soon have been enough . . . for a nuclear weapon."
Israel's subjective claim of urgency and clarity of Iraqi intent con-
trast sharply with such objective evaluations.
198. The IAEA considerd Mr. Richter to have been fired for compro-
mising confidential documents. Wash. Post
,
July 8, 1981, A18.
199. Senate Hearings on Osirak , oral testimony of Mr. Roger Richter,
June 19, 1981.
200. 2^., prepared comments of Mr. Richter, at 4-5. Mr. Richter's




201. Id.., oral testimony of Mr, Richter. Mr. Begin had also made
a claim that Soviet technicians were present at Osirak. Christian
Sci. Monitor
,
June 15, 1981, 1. He may again have been "confused"
concerning Soviet IAEA inspectors.
202. Id., prepared comments, at 12.
203. Mr, Richter made reference in his prepared comments (at 6-7)
and again in his oral testimony to 100 tons of "yellow cake" (UoOq)
which Iraq possesses and which would not be under IAEA safeguards
unless Iraq reported to the IAEA that it intended to convert the yellow
cake into a safeguarded category of material. It must be noted, how-
ever, that even this purchase of yellow cake from Portugal was properly
reported to the IAEA. Far from being "clandestine" Iraq appears to
have faithfully reported all of its uranium purchases. N,Y. Times
,
June 19, 1981, Al . On the other hand, a ship of West German registry
carrying 200 tons of uranium ore disappeared from the high seas in
1968, then reappeared several weeks later under a different flag, with
a different name and a different crew — and without the uranium,
which American investigators believed had been diverted to Israel.
N.Y. Times
,
June 25, 1981, Al. If such are Israeli methods, it is
strange that Israel feels entitled to complain of the "suspicious"
nature of Iraqi purchases, which have been conducted openly on the
international market and have involved no substantiated violations
'' of either NPT or IAEA standards.
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204. Senate Hearings on Osirak , June 19, 1981, prepared comments of
Mr. Richter, at l-!2.
205. In a July 11, 1981, editorial of the Jerusalem Post , after com-
menting that the Osirak raid was at best a short-term solution to the
long-term certainty of a Middle East nuclear arms race, the Post
commented: "At the last U.N. General Assembly, Israel floated a pro-
posal for a nuclear-free Middle East . When asked about this at his
press conference on Tuesday, Mr. Begin dismissed the idea as just
'words, words.' Had he forgotten that it was his own, or at least
his government's, idea? Was he suggesting that, with (Osirak) in
ruins, he no longer needed it?" Reprinted in Israeli Mirror
,
June 18,
1981, 1. See also Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 12, 1981, 3 ("When
asked if he would open up Israeli nuclear facilities to inspection
should a zone become feasible, Prime Minister Begin replied "Words,
words, words. We want deeds, deeds, deeds.")
206. Concerning the cost-benefit, vice necessity, analysis which may
have lead to the Israeli decision to bomb Osirak, see Christian Sci.
Monitor, June 9, 1981, 1, wherein it states:
A few Israeli defense specialists have advocated a
nuclear deterrent for Israel. But others point out
the tremendous expense — perhaps more than keeping up
with the current Mideast arms race — since Israel would
have to maintain a second-strike capability.
On might thus attirbute the decision to a permutation of economic
determinism rather than to a legitimate concern for any immediate
threat to national survival.
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207. Senate Hearings on Osirak , June 19, 1981, prepared comments of
Mr. Richter, at 15.
208. Senator John Glenn (D-Oh.) termed the Osirak raid a "vigilante
tactic." N.Y. Times
,




June 15, 1981, A16.
210. Israel has claimed that its decision to bomb was based on
"sources of unquestioned reliability." N.Y. Times
,
June 19, 1981,
All. It may be more than semantical that the sources were referred
to as "unquestioned," rather the "unquestionable."
211. The retraction also appeared in the Washington Post on June
17, 1981, at A22. On the same page, an ad sponsored by the Louis D.
Brandeis District of the Zionist Organization of America, after con-
deming the "whip-wielding media" and "crocodile tears," urged "fair-
minded Americans" to let their Congressmen know that "the facts are
clear," and then proceeded to repeat the Hussein quote as a fact, even
though the Israelis had already retracted the contention at least two
days before.
212. A quote by Professor Degler ( see note 175, supra ) , concerning
manipulation of the facts surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis to
support the Israeli position, appears equally apposite here; "If
such tactics are necessary to defend the Israeli case, then it may
indeed be indefensible." N.Y. Times, June 25, 1981, A18.
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213. The penchant for the word "lust" is not that of the author,
but that of supporters of Israel's position. See
,
e.g. , the "colorful"
prepared comments of Representative Tom Lantos (D-Cal.) during the
Senate Hearings on Osirak (June 25, 1981) at 1: "When a seller hungry
for oil meets a buyer lusting after nuclear weapons, it will take more
thank a diplomatic chaperone to keep them apart." Also inserted into
the record of the Senate hearing was Mr. Lantos' condemnation of the
"holier-than-thou pontificating" by the rejectors of the Israeli
Osirak claim, for in his opinion:
Today there is not a Member of Congress who would not
support President Reagan were we confronted with hos-
tile nuclear capabilities by Castro's Cuba. The American
people would indeed rejoice if the U.S. Air Force in a
brilliant, preemptive strike destroyed Cuba's nuclear
facilities. We would proudly and rightly call it an
essential exercise of legitimate self-defense.
One might add that the presumed "rejoicing" might be of only ephemeral
duration, givm a 37 minute estimated lag time between the possible re-
taliatory launching of Soviet land-based missiles and their arrival
in the United States.
214. It might be noted that if Western nations are so tainted by
subservience to OPEC and the lust for oil, then how does Israel
escape from a like "taint," for during the negotiational process of
the Camp David accords, Israel's agreement to give up territory that
wasn't its to give was in part predicated upon a separate arrangement
ensuring Israel of a guaranteed supply of oil from Egypt. Energy :.
availability is a legitimate national consideration of all states; it
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implies no taint simply because it forms a pact of the complex fabric
of a nation's foreign policy.
215. It might be noted that Israel did not complain of France's
corrupted ethics when that same France, in the late 50 's and
early '60's, provided Israel the technology for the reactor at Dimona.
See N.Y. Times
,
June 25, 1981, Al.
216. A French nuclear attache acknowledged that highly enriched
uranium could be used to make nuclear weapons but insisted the French
had tight safeguards over its use, had pre-irradiated it in the smaller
reactor to make it too dangerous to handle for someone wanting to
make a weapon out of it and that the Iraqis had never hinted of such
a move. Wash. Post
, June 14, 1981, A34
.
217. The clause provided that a joint Franco-Iraqi committee would
decide on the experimental programs for both French and Italian
reactors at Osirak and that French technicians would take part in the
experiments. Wash. Post
,
June 18, 1981, Al
.
218. Within hours of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's argument for
economic aid sanctions against Israel at a secret June 10 National
Security Council meeting called to discuss the Osirak attack, Mr. Begin
had been informed and was publically denouncing Secretary Weinberger's
position. Wash. . Post
,
June 24, 1981, A21. See also Wash. Post , June
17, 1981, A22; Wash. Post
,






June 28, 1981, A15.
220. Concerning the dangers involved in U.S. ethnic lobbies placing another
nation's interests above those of the IMited States, see Senator Mathias,
"Ethnic Groups and Foreign Policy," Foreign Aff
.
,
Spring 1981, 975, at 976
(noting that George Washington "warned against the twin evils of excessive
animosity and excessive attachment to particular foreign nations, especially
the latter, ' facillitating the illusion of an imaginary ccximon interest, in
cases ^siiere no real conmon interest exists. . . .' "). At an ASEAN-hosted
dinner at the Conference on Cairibodia (July 13, 1981), the Israeli ambassador's
invitation was cancelled due to the baribing of the Iraqi reactor, and
Secretary of State Haig refused to attend "in the interest of fairness and . . . ,
the United Nations' principle of universality." Wash. Post
,
July 14, 1981, AlO.
How, one might ask, do the baribing of Osirak and the continued operation of
Dimona add up to the universality? In any event, the dinner incident again
points out the universality of the cotiprcmise of U.S. global
,
vice just
mideastem, interests, that continued U.S. sipport of Israel's expanded
sovereignty entails. Mr. Begin 's concept of an alliance also includes the caveat
that it is "absurd" to think that Israel should consult with the IMited States
before initiating further "defensive" actions ^ich might be prejudicial to
U.S. interests. Wash. Post
,
July 14, 1981, Al. As one Begin aide has stated:
"-If Israel had to get permission (fron the IMited States), she would never be
able to act." Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 16, 1981, 6. Besides the fact that
this alliance without consultation between allies results in an alliance with
only unidirectional benefits, such statenents evidence a knowledge on the part
of Israel that even its strongest international supporter can find little legal
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merit in Israel's perceptions of necessity and proportionality. Given this
knowledge, it is small wonder that Israel does not attenpt to exhaust its
diplomatic remedies, but instead chooses to act first, and only then to
engage its extremely vocal lobbying efforts to convince the American public
after the fact. If U.S. military and econcmic aid to Israel continue unabated,
she sinply has no incentive to subscribe to international law, ^^tlich requires
that the public-relations efforts of peace be made in advance of the "defensive"
efforts of coersion.
221. Wash. Post , June 17, 1981, A22.
222. Wash. Post
,
June 17, 1981, A22.
223. See
, e.g. . Wash. Post , June 23, 1981, D9.
224. As to the increasingly Nazi methods being adopted or tolerated by the
Israeli government during the Israeli political canpaign, see N.Y. Times
,
June
25, 1981, A8 (disruption of Labor Party rallies, with orchestrated jeering and
pelting of opposition candidates with eggs; intimidation of opposition voters;
smashing of windows of stores wfeLch displayed opposition placards; "demon i 7a-
tion" of all Palestinians; increased press censorship; enactment of legislation
effectively making Palestinian patriotism a crime; utilizing McCarthyism tactics
for those perceived to be "soft on Arabs"). Jacobo Timerman, a Jewish publisher
tortured and inprisoned by the Argentinian Junta, is now in Israel, and he has
stated: "I see very clearly a repition of what happened in Argentina here. . . .
There is always a donocratic way to elect a fascist government." Id.
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225. As to Israeli opposition statements concerning the political motives
behind Mr. Begin 's order of the destruction of Osirak, see Wash. Post , June 16,
1981, Al; Wash. Post , June 11, 1981, Al. In regailing the opposition concerning
their questions as to the dcanestic political motives behind the bcxiibing,
Mr. Begin, like Mark Anthony at the burial of Caesar, reinforced an
accusation of treason by denying it enphatically before settling on the
world "sabotage." The Israeli Prime Minister stated: "I hate with deadly
hatred the wDrd treason. You have never hear this word from my mouth. Anybody
can ejqDress an opinion, and can err. It's still not treason. Treason, it's




226. Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
June 25, 1981, prepared ccranents of Dr. D. Pipes,
passim . One might further note that much of the Senate testimony con ceming
the alleged instability of Iraq and its President, besides being equally
applicable to Israel, is also irrelevant under the Begin Doctrine, wtoich refers
to any enemy. The United Sates has recently given its support to an Egyptian
reactor project, and although Mr. Begin is now willing to consider Egypt a non-
enemy, will that still be the case wtoen and if he returns all of the Sinai to
Egypt and thus loses his leverage over that sovereign nation? One mi^t also
note that the Islamic heritage that Pakistan shares with the Arah Middle East
raises the possibility that Mr. Begin might choose to exercise his Doctrine
on Parkistani nuclear facilities, due to the "threat" of an "Islamic bomb."
The possibility of this extention of the Begin Doctrine must be particularly
disturbing to the United States, as PaleLstan is a prcxninent object of U.S. support
in the Asian subcontinent, including ongoing support for its nuclear energy program.
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227. In its self-proclainied role as protector of the rightest Christian
Phalangists in the Bekaa Valley of Lenanon, Israeli jets in late April 1981
shot down two helicopters of the Syrian peace-keeping force, \^ilich is in
Lebanon under Arab League aegis and with the approval of the Lebanese govern-
ment, \^iiose head of state, President Elias Sarkis, is himself a Maronite
Christian. S3rria then established SAM anti-aircraft missile sites in the
valley to protect against further Israeli incursions. Mr. Begin has regailed
against the missiles as a threat ^^ilich Israel will not tolerate. One may
conclude that under Israeli international law (1) Arab forces have no ri^t
to protect themselves against Israeli attack, and (2) Israel may intervene ^^tlen
she will to "protect" Christians in a foreign country, but Arabs may never inter-
vene to protect Palestinians in occupied territories. In justification of the
Israeli intervention, Mr. Begin has stated: "the 'survival of the Christians
of Lebanon' is at stake." Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 23, 1981, 13. As noted
' in the same article:
I
Overall, however. Christian leaders in the Middle East are
'
bitterly opposed to Israeli policies - especially policies
that concern Jerusalan. Signatories to a resolution declaring
I
Zionism "the new Nazism" were the Greek Orthodox patriarch to
'
Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem; the archbishop of the
Syrian Catholic Church; the Syrian Orthodox patriarch; the
Armenian Catholic archbishop to Damascus; the Maronite
Catholic patriarch to Damascus; and other church officials.
j Again, Mr. Begin reserves the right to unilaterally determine not only ^^ilen
the "survival" of Israel is at stake, but also the "survival" of Christian
cammmities outside his borders. Former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman
has offered a different justification by sinply stating that Israel reserves
the right to strike in Lebanon not only in retaliation to Palestinian attacks,
but "at any time and at any place that Israel deens desirable." Wash. Post
,
March 16, 1981, Al. Neither justification has any legal validity imder inter-
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national law, but at least Mr. Weizman seems to provide a more honest
appraisal. The Syrian missile crisis also affords an insight into the inverted
concept of "defense" that the Israeli claims require. During a press confer-
ence on June 16, 1981, President Reagan made reference to the Syrian SAM
anti-aircraft missiles in Lebanon as "offensive weapons." Wash. Post
,
June
17, 1981, Al. Thus F16's which fly a thousand miles to bomb a nuclear reactor
are "defensive", vsMle short range missiles, which chould hit Israeli jets
only if they were deep inside Lebanon, are "offensive."
228. See Wash. Post
,
June 29, 1981, Al. As to Mr. Begin 's aggressive posture
being his electoral salvation, see also Wash. Post
,
July 1, 1981, Al.
229. As to the factual blackness, vel non , of Iraq's danestic condition,
see the oral testimony of Ambassador James Aikens (former Ambassador to Saudia
Arabia) and of Mr. Joseph Malone (President of Middle East Research Assoc. , Inc. ),
Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
June 25, 1981 (both contesting the position of Dr.
Pipes).
230. See note 147, supra . Nazi Germany, it might be noted, invoked humanitarian
considerations, with references to "assaults on the life and liberty of
minorities," in justification of its 'intervention" in Czechoslovakia in 1939.
Proclamation on the German Occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, March 15, 1939 , 4
Doc. British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (3d ser. ) No. 259, at 257.
231. Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
June 19, 1981, oral testimony of Dr. Herbert
Kouts and Dr. Robert Seldon. As to an estimate of only a thousand feet, see
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1981, A9.
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232. The eiphasis on the timing of the raid before the reactor went critical
is best explained not in humanitarian teims, but as a quiet atteipt on the
part of the Israelis to ensure at least an apparent distinction between its
action and any discussion of a retaliatory attack on Dimona.
233. When asked ^^1lether this mistake represented another Israel intelligence
failure, Array Intelligence Oiief Yehoshua Sa^uy replied, "perhaps the failure
was in France." Wash. Post , June 10, 1981, Al. Again, not satisfied with
inplying U.S. conplicity in the raid, the Israelis were thus attoipting to
inplicate the French.
234. If testimony supportive of the Israeli position before the Senate Hearings
on Osirak is any indicator, much of the Israeli "intelligence" pivoted on the
presunption of Iraqi clandestine efforts for lack of an explanation as to vihy
an oil producer wDuld want a reactor. Repeated reference was made during the
hearings to the absence of any econcxnic need on the part of Iraq for a nuclear
energy facility and thus the absence of any acceptable explanation for its
construction other than weapons production. This line of argument is disturbing
for a nuirber of reasons. (1) Besides ignoring "the inalienable sovereign right
of Iraq. . . to establish programs of technological and nuclear development . . ,
for peaceful purposes in accordance with their present and future needs " (see
article 4 of the Security Coimcil's condemnation of the Osirak attack; reprinted
in N.Y. Times
,
June 19, 1981, AlO), it approaches the question of Iraqi national
values from only a two dimensional direction, assuming that econanics could be
the only peaceful purpose for reactor construction. Centuries ago, the Middle
East was the center of the Western wDrld for science and learning, but now
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apparently enlightenment is no longer even considered as a legitimate
objective of Arab endeavors (see, e.g.
,
Senate Hearings on Osirak
,
June 25,
1981, Dr. Pipes, at 4, ^^tiei^ he takes as an apparently permanent given the
"low state of Iraqi science"). Further, a develojxnent program may be ambig-
uous, but the Soviets can also point to the ambiguous military aspects of U.S.
space probes and shuttle flights, but that gives them no right to destroy
those scientific ejqjeriments based on the ambiguous "threat" that they present.
(2) It ignores the presence of very valid econonic considerations for an oil
producing country to invest in nuclear research, for just as the oil coipanies
have diversified their enei^ holdings to ensure their continued role in the
enei^ market of the future, the CPEC nations vould be econonically irresponsible
if they did not do likewise. Hydrocarbons will not always be the world's energy
I
staple; the oil-producing countries appreciate this, and it is only good business
judgment to invest current petroprofits in alternative-technology research,
if they are to avoid beconing "banana republic" export econonies in the decades
I
ahead. (3) Even if one facit of Iraqi intent were to be the development of
nuclear weapon technology, it ignores the marked distinction between weapons
capability and weapons use. Given the nuclear capability that Israel already
possesses, it is only reasonable that an "enemy" wDuld want a nuclear counter-
option, a second-strike nuclear alternative to deter further Israeli "defensive"
expansion. (4) Perhaps most disturbing of all within the context of international
law, the argument presumes a unilateral right on the part of Israel to determine
the "needs" of Iraq and to destroy \^imtever Israel determines to be in excess
of those "needs." Again it is a situation \\1iere Israel's claim to unique security
"needs" eclipses all sovereignty rights of other nations. One might add one
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fiirther point here: if Israel demands the right to determine the needs of Iraq,
^^y does Mr. Begin consider it "absurd" that the U.S. should have the right
to even question the "defensive" needs of Israel?
235. As an apparent example of what Mr. Begin cx^nsiders exhaustion of
diplomatic remedies, the Jerusalem Post has reported that Mr. Begin has told
his advisors that he "deliberately overstated the inportance of the Sjrrain
missiles (in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon) to Israel's security to distract
attrition frcra preparations for Israel's boiibing raid" on Osirak. Wash. Post
,
June 26, 1981, A22. U.S. Special Envoy Philip Habib's diplomatic efforts were
thus exhausted on a diversionary non-issue.
236. See II Oppenheim-Lauterpacht , supra note 6, at 197.
237. U.N. Charter art 2(4). The current Israeli Ambassador to the U.N.
,
Yahuda Blum, has previously noted that in li^t of article 2(4), the prevailing
view holds that a claim of one state that it is in a "state of war" with
another state is incoipatible with the Charter. See Blum, supra note 3, at 77.
238. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field
,
Aug. 12,
l&i9 (1956), 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea
,
Aug. 12, 1949 (1956), 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
,
Aug. 12, 1949 (1956),
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949 (1956), 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365), in their conmon article 2, also make no distinction in the international
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context between war or "any other armed conflict."
239. See
, e.g. . U.N.G.A. Res. 3236 (XXIX), "Question of Palestine" (1974)
(adopted by a vote of 89 to 8 (U.S.), with 37 absentions); reprinted at 71
Dep't State Bull . 859 (Dec. 16, 1974). The issue that will not go away—the
right of Palestinian self-determination—is the same issue that former State
Department Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Loy
Henderson, unsuccessfuly raised in 1947. See Yot. Rel. of the U.S.
,
Vol. V.
(1947), 1152-58, 1280-82. Thirty-foiir years later, the United States govern-
ment remains apparently lacking in the decisional will to lay aside donestic
political considerations and address the issue squarely. See also Mathias,
supra note 220, at 992 (noting that General Geoi^e Marshall, Secretary of State
at the time of Israel ' s independence, also urged that decisions on Palestine
not be based on dcmestic politics).
240. N. Goldmann, "True Neutrality for Israel," Foreign Pol'y
.
Winter 1979-80, 133,
at 140-141. See Wash. Post
,
June 27, 1981, A18, '«*iich notes that Mr. Begin
has remained inplacable in his steadfast policies of encouraging Jewish settle-
ments on the Arab West Bank, annexing the eastern sector of Jerusalem and
declaring the city the undivided capital of Israel, attacking Palestinian camps
In southern Lebanon and in effect taking part of that country as a buffer zone
on Israel's northern border; bcxnbing Iraq's nuclear installation and ranaining
intransigent in his refusal to have aiy dealings with the PLD.
241. President Hussein continues to reject U.N. Resolution 242, but he has
suggested that this is not due to any refusal to peimit the existence of Israel,
but due to the shortcomings of that Resolution in not directly addressing
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and resolving the underlying Palestinian question and the return of "usurped
territorities" . "Issues and Answers," ABC television network, June 28, 1981.
242. Similar to the Brezhinev quote that the Soviet Union does "not covet the
lands or wealth of others" (p. 38 supra), Mr. Begin has stated "I do not accept
the term occupation. We don't occupy anything that is foreign to us." Wash.
Post "Parade", June 14, 1981, 9. Also concerning autonony, vice sovereignty,
on the West Bank, Begin has stated that a "Palestinian state. . .wDuld be a
mortal danger to us. . . .". Id. Given \^1iat Israel was "forced" to do based
on the 'fnortal danger" posed by Osirak, this argument would lead to, and sane
wDuld argue has already lead to, an Israeli justification for attenpting to
destroy the Palestinian People. Concerning the plight of Palestinian refugees,
Mr. Begin blames not Israel but the Arab states, stating that this problem
"could have been solved many, many years ago through resettlement (else\^ere)."
Id. In short , the dictates of Biblical Lebensraum require that everyone else
move to acccraodate the sacred rights of Eretz Yisrael. Mr. Begin has stated
that the election results are a "mandate for Eretz Yisrael" (the Biblical
vision of Israel \^iiich includes the West Bank and Gaza). Wash. Post
,
July 9,
1981, A18. Concerning the Israeli rejection of any possibility of Palestinian
sovereignty on the West Bank, see Wash. Post
,
July 9, 1981, A18. Biblicizing
the Palestinian West Bank as "Judea and Samaria" to avoid the issue of
sovereignty recalls the Nazi precedent of referring t) "Bohenia and Rforavia"
instead of West Czechnslovakia. As to the world position on the West Bank
question, see U.N.S.C. Res. 465 (1980), ^ich deplores Israeli settlement
policies and declares them devoid of legal validity. The U.S. voted in favor of





243. One might wonder as to the claim that security is the motivating
factor behind the Israeli "defensive" actions, as opposed to the desire for
a unilateral extension of values, ^Nhen at the same time, Israel has chosen
to move its capital frcxn Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thus voluntarily increasing
its personal insecurity by moving closer to the source of the alleged threat
.
244. Major Saad Haddad, a former Lebanese military officer who controls an
enclave in Southern Lebanon, is claimed by Israel to be a free agent, even
though his militia is armed by Israeli sources, clothed in Israli aniiy fatigues,






Mar. 18, 1981, Al; Wash. Post , Mar. 15, 1981, Al.
245. R)r an analysis of the Israeli claim to represent The Jewish People
wDrldwide, a concept rejected even by the United States, see 8 Whiteman, Digest
of International Law 35 (1967); see also W. T. Mallison, "The Diplomatic Methods
to Achieve Minimum Order in the Middle East," Jour, of Int'l L. and Econ. 113,
at 118-19 (June 1971).
246. It might be mentioned that the United States, like Iraq, has frequently
exercized its "constitutive" prerogative cf withholding recognition of govern-
ments, \^4iether due to its methods of gaining or retaining power, its question-
able stability, its lack of defined territory, its lack of a popular base, or its
unwillingness to coiply with its international obligations under treaties and
ciistonary law. As has been indicated by George Aldrich, Acting Legal Advisor
to the U.S. State Department at the time of his testimony:
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Each case of recognition—or nonrecognition—involves its own
set of factual and political circumstances and depends, in the
final analysis, on the judgnent of the executive branch.
The decision vjhethev to extend recognition is made after
weighing a number of considerations relevant to the basic
question of whether recognition or nonrecognition would better
serve the foreign policy of the United States.
Hearings on S. Res. 205 (U.S. Recognition of Foreign Governments) before the
Senate Ccmn. on Foreign Relations
,
91st Cong. , 1st Sess. (1969) at 9. For a
general discussion of the U.S. position on recognition, see Barnes, "United
States Recognition Policy and Caiibodia," reprinted in Vietnam War and Int ' 1
Law (R.A. Falk ed. ), Vol. 3, 148 (1972).
247. Even if Iraq were to agree to recognize Israel under the conditions
of the 1967 U.N.S.C. Resolution 242 (XXII), ^^*lich called for the "withdrawal
of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and
the establislment of "a just and lasting peace" with "secure and recognized
boundaries," it is interesting to note that, under the Israeli interpretation
of that resolution, it has no obligation to withdraw frcan the West Bank and
can chose to exercise full sovereignty over that area. See Bluq supra note 3,
at 94-98 (noting that Resolution 242 did not require withdrawal fran all
occupied territories); see also the caiments of Mr. Blum, the Israeli Bribassy
in Washington, D.C. , and Nfoshe Dayan, \\1iich are reprinted in A Report by Sen.
James Abourezk to the Senate Ocmnittee on the Judiciary: Colonialization of the
West Bank Territories by Israel (Ooiim. Print), at 5-6 (Dec. 1977) (concerning
Israel's claim to better "relative" title to the West Bank and its refusal to
consider the creation of a Palestinian State in any foim).
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248. As noted supra at page 60, Israel has invoked national-security grounds
to protect its "sources of unquestioned reliability," thus refusing to provide
the wDrld coimunity with a full disclosure of the information upon vMch its
claim to necessity rests. Especially in the Osirak instance, ^ere Israeli
intelligence appears to have been so consistently inaccurate, the result of
such a posture is circular. The world ccrnmmity is to be the final adjudicator,
but the claimant, after stating that national security required the action,
maintains further that that same national-security interest prevents the
presentation of any evidence upon MsMch the adjudicator might decide. The
case thus is imbued with ^at might be called the Martin Luther defense, as the
claimant demands that it be exonerated "on faith alone."
249. In another contrast to the Israeli double standard between Osirak and
Dimona, it might be noted that, after the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved.
President Kennedy ordered the removal of medium-range missiles from Italy and
Turkey, v^felch had had a land-based strike capability of delivering warheads
on Moscow. Christian Sci. Mpnitor
,
June 19, 1981, 13.
250. As to the irresponsibility of the Israeli aerial attack and the overall
contrast it poses to the U.S. actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis, see
the coiments of Philip KLutzmick, a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
in 1962 and a former President of B'nai B'rith International and the World
Jewish Congress, Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 19, 1981, 23.
251. Mr. Begin 's proclivity for playing the holocaust card is ironic also in
that the majority of the Jews in Israel are non-European, never having experienced
the Nazi reign of terror, and yet it is this electorate base of Sephardic Jewry
from \^Mch Mr. Begin draws his political support. The substantial majority
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of European Jewry, i.e., those ^^tlo were closest to the autrocities of the
holocaust, vote against Mr. Begin and his growing militarism. Wash. Post
,






June 19, 1981, A20 (concerning the Syrian missile crisis);
Wash. Post
,
June 4, 1981, A21 (decrying the F.R.G.).
252. Senator Mathias has noted that the American Isi^el Public Affairs
Conmittee distributed copies of the novel Holocaust to every member of Congress.
See Mathias, supra note 220, at 994. It might be also noted that \\tole to
accuse others of lusting for oil is considered appropriate, to even state
publically that a strong Jewish lobby exists in the United States brings
iinnediate response such as "defamatory," "maligned American Jews," and an
"insult to the Jewish cannunity and indeed to the American public." Wash. Post
,
July 12, 1981, A6 (Jewish organizations' response to the statenents of Rep. Paul
McCloskey (R-CaL) to the effect that the Jewish ccranunity has a tendency to
control the actions of Congress). Senator Mathias was also the object of
criticism ( see Wash. Post , June 28, 1981, Bl) for his Foreign Affairs article,
\^erein he makes the timely observation that "political appeals to separatism
and parochialian (by American ethnic groups). . . .belie the cherished philosophy
of the 'melting pot' (see Mathias, supra note 220, at 980). Concerning the issue
of parochialism, one might think that it would be disturbing to many Americans
of Jewish heritage, who have always supported liberal causes like the A.C.L.U.
as the best insurance of equal protection for all, that Mr. Begin chose instead
to call Mr. Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority in his efforts to find support
for the Osirak raid. Wash. Post
,
July 12, 1981, A6. In short, to resort to ad
honinem arguments, whether accusations of "oil corruption" or "Jewish money,"
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serves only to distract attention from the serious, issue-oriented discussions
needed to resolve the underlying problems extant in the Middle East. Mr. Begin
has been accused of attenpting to "demonize" all Palestinians and even Arabs
in general, ^^1lich unfortunately evidences a willingness on his part to adopt
the very stereotypic consciousness which served the Nazis so well in their
canpaign of terror against European Jewry four decades ago.
253. For a reprint of the Security Council Resolution of Condemnation, see
N.Y. Times, June 19, 1981, AlO. Israeli Ambassador to the U.N., Yahuda Blum,
has termed the Security Council's action as a "tenporary irritant." Wash. Post
,
June 20, 1981, Al. One might ccnpare this response with the words of Thciiias
Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence concerning "a decent respect to
the opinion of mankind."
254. Concerning the FY 82 conmitment, see Christian Sci. Monitor
,
June 16,
1981, 6. Since World War II, Israel has been the second highest recipient of
U.S. foreign aid. Wash. Post
,
July 10, 1981, A21. On a per capita basis,
it may be presumed to be the number one recipient. In the wards of the Christian
Science ^fc)nitor :
It must strike the American people as odd that, for all the
military and econcxnic aid \^iiich the US has given Israel - that
aid accounts for almost half of the total US aid budget this




June 22, 1981, 24. And yet, in an almost incredible
example of Congressional indulgence of Israeli danands, a majority of both
Houses, only 17 days after Israeli fighters violated Saudi air space on their
way to Osirak, has petitioned the White House not concerning the withholding
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of F16's from Israel, but concerning the withholding of AWAC suiveillance
plaiES from Saudi Arabia , on the basis that the Saudis "have displayed a
hostility that must be interpreted as their deliberate intention to pronote
continued instability in the Middle East." N.Y. Tinies , June 25, 1981, Al.
Further, at the same time that Congress was attenpting to thwart the AWACS
sale to the Saudis, the House Appropriations subconmittee , -wiiile cutting
virtually all sections of the foreign military sales bill, was adding $50
million to the $500 million "forgiven loan" to Israel for military hardware.
Wash. Post , June 25, 1981. Al. It is not difficult to understand, with such
examples for the world to see, vfhy America's credibility is so severely
questioned around the world.
255. Aside frcm current international law, even concepts of natural law
appear contrary to such an expansive claim. Inmanuel Kant, in his treatise
on the natural law of states, recognizes a right to defensively attack not
only wtoen a state is faced with an "inmediate threat of attack" ( "unmittelbar
bevorstehenden Angriff"), but also a threat occasioned by the "terribly
growing power (potentia tranenda ) of another state" ("fuerchterlich anwach-
sende Macht"). But Kant bases this latter natural right on another natural
principle, namely the balance of power ("Recht des Gleichgewichts" ) . It is
thus a right of weaker states to exercise against the stronger until an
equilibrium is reached, not a right of stronger states to perpetuate their
military (or nuclear) si:5)eriority. Imnanuel Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde
der Rechtslehre
,
Vol. II (1797), sec. 56. Grotius is even stricter, rejecting
out of hand any right to attack based on the growth of another nation's power
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which might later becone capable of inflicting damage. He states: "Aber dass
die Moeglichkeit , Gewalt zu erleiden, schon das Recht, Gewalt zu gebrauchen,
gebe, ist ohne alien gerechten Grund" (author's rendering : "But (the proposition)
that the possibility that one might suffer from an act of force already gives
one the right to ccranit an act of force is without any legal basis"). H.
Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (translation by J.H. v. Kirchmann), Vol. II
(1869), 237.
256. Itoilateral extension of values, ^^iiether subtitled as Manifest Destiny,
Drang nach Osten, Workers Movement of the World, or Revival of Judea and
Samaria, all botton on the generic denaninator of colonialian. Although Israel
and the Soviet Union condemn each other's positions, the functional similarity
in their colonial actions bears further mention. Ibr example, (1) both have
injected irredentian into their occupation policies, Israel by annexing East
Jerusalem and the USSR by apparently annexing the WaMian Corridor of north-
eastern Afghanistan, thereby cutting Afghanistan off frcxn the PRC and
establishing a common border between the USSR and Pakistan). Concerning the
Wakhan Corridor, see note 189, sig)ra . (2) Both have taken steps to institution-
alize the dependence of the occupied territory upon the occupier through
electrical power grid realignments. Ccfrpare J. Terry, "State Terrorian: A
Juridical Examination in Terms of International Law," J. of Palestinian Stud.
,
issue 37 (1980), 94, at 110, with Wash. Post , Feb. 27, 1981, A20. (3) Both
continue to frustrate international efforts at n^otiated settlements by refusing
to allow the respective resistance movements a place at the n^otiating table.
Concerning the Soviet refusal to allow the Mujahaddin any role in the
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n^otiating process, see Wash. Post
,
Feb. 12, 1981, A29. It might be noted
further that although the Palestinian and Afghani situations are disparate
geographically, they share a coninon issue of Islamic independence.
257. To the extent that the "Carter Doctrine" concerning protection of the
Persian Gulf remains the American econcxnic and strategic policy position
of the Reagan Administration, America's continued strong support of Israel
in spite of its actions "severly conplicates" the viability of its coordinated
implementation. See Newson, "America Engulfed," For. Policy
,
Sunnier 1981,
17, at 22. Mr, Newson, former undersecretary of state for political affairs,
also questions the unilateral cornerstone of the Carter Doctrine ("An atteipt
by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,
and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military
force") in coiparison with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, which pivoted on
foreign nations requesting assistance from the United States. Id. at 17.
Even if one overlooks this unilateral aspect of the Carter Doctrine and even
if one assumes that the U.S. has the right and the ability to enforce it,
it is vrorth noting that the expansiveness of the Begin Doctrine has the potential
to eclipse and defeat the continued-flow-of-oil basis ^^tiich underlies the
Carter Doctrine. Given the fact that the Begin Doctrine applies to "any enen^^,"
and given the Israeli claim that it is the wDrld corruption by Arab oil that
isolates Israel and "forces" her to take "defensive" acts, it requires no
Kierkegaardian leap of faith to assume that future Israeli attacks will not be
directed only at the fruits of petrodollar power (like nuclear reactors), but
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also at the source of that power itself—the oil fields.
258. A Congressional Research Service report to Congress concerning the Osirak
raid specifically gives warning as to the precedent \^tiich will be set for other
nations if the U.S. fails to take effective action against Israel. See Wash.
Post
,
June 20, 1981, A17.
259. With the United States' historic willingness to accept Israel's
definition of "self-defense", it is small wDnder that the People's Republic of
China is unconsoled by the assurance that any arms sales to Taiwan will be
for "defensive" purposes only. See Wash. Post, June 17, 1981, Al; Wash. Post,
June 5, 1981, Al (concerning White House "determination" to enforce that
portion of the Taiwan Relations Act v4iich peimits only the sale of "defensive"
weapons to Taiwan).
260. A newspaper in Beirut has noted that the IMited States is giving "words
to the Arabs and aims to Israel." Wash. Post
,
June 18, 1981, A22. This
perception of Western legerdemain is not new to the Third World. A tribal
chieftan in colonial Africa was once quoted as remarking" "When the white
man came, we had the land and he had the Bible; now we have the Bible, and he
has the land."
261. Mr. Begin has acknowledged that there has been tension with the United
States over the use of U.S. -supplied fighter baiibers at Osirak, but he has
sought to portray that as a problem for the United States and not for Israel.
Wash. Post, July 14, 1981, Al. Such a coiment capsulizes the Israeli approach
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to its United States "alliance" — a single-entry accounting system \\iiich




Author • s Note
:
Due to conflicting military commitments, the time
devoted to research, drafting and editing of this
paper was necessarily compressed. Every effort has
still been made to achieve a polished final product,
but should an occasional "rough edge" appear in the
paper, understanding and clemency are requested.
Once the Senate Hearings on Osirak are reduced to a
final Senate report, the footnotes of the bound copy
of this paper (on file at the National Law Center,
George Washington University, Washington, D.C.)
will be modified to reflect the complete citational
format
.
Footnote citations to newspaper material and quota-
tions refer to the page at which the pertinent ar-
ticle begins , not to subsequent pages where it may
be continued.
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